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While Article VI of the US Constitution establishes treaties as supreme 
federal law, scholars and lawmakers have historically doubted that state 
judges will enforce the United States’ international obligations when they 
conflict with important state interests. The Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, codified in US law as the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), is the first major 
family law treaty ratified by the United States. Its provisions are regularly 
enforced by both federal and state courts. Notwithstanding the relationship 
of the treaty to important state interests like the integrity of family court 
systems, financial and social support for families and minors, and the 
substantive law of marriage and divorce, there is general convergence 
between federal and state judges on the applicability of the convention and 
certain exceptions authorized by the treaty. Several federal district courts, 
acknowledging these state and federal interests in efficacious adjudication 
of treaty claims, have abstained from hearing ICARA applications in favor 
of state proceedings. Federal appellate courts, however, have been 
overwhelmingly hostile to these abstention decisions, citing the role of 
federal courts in upholding the United States’ international commitments. 
Thise article argues that federal appellate courts have largely ignored the 
jurisdictional plan designed by Congress in favor of an implied Article III 
power to enforce treaties, and recommends changes for both ICARA and 














In 2010, the US Supreme Court decided a child custody case, Abbott v. 
Abbott, despite its traditional preference that state law and state courts 
handle family law matters.
1
 In that case, the Supreme Court resolved a 
specific issue with respect to child custody: whether or not a term in a 
custodial decree giving a noncustodial parent the right to prohibit a child’s 
travel nevertheless constituted a “right of custody.”2 Under most 
circumstances, that issue would be resolved by a state court of general 
jurisdiction or a state family court. The Abbotts, however, came to the 
Supreme Court by way of a treaty the United States joined in 1988 and an 
implementing statute that gave federal and state courts concurrent original 
jurisdiction over claims made under that treaty.
3
 This article explores the 
problems posed by regulating family law through international treaties—a 
practice that sets federal courts’ historical authority to uphold the United 
States’ international commitments on a collision course with the 
traditional role states play in family law matters. It argues that federal 
courts view international treaties as fundamentally tied to their Article III 
judicial power and will narrowly construe Congressional efforts to share 
or reallocate that jurisdiction to state courts. 
The treaty at issue in Abbott—the 1980 Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction—has, over the course of its 
twenty-five years in federal and state courts, generated two related 
problems that tie into deeper, historical constitutional conflicts. The first is 
the tension in Article III of the US Constitution between the separation of 
powers principle embodied in the establishment of the judicial power and 
Congress’s ability to limit that power.4 The second is the capability or 
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1
 In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations 
of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the 
laws of the United States.”). 
2
 Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (U.S. 2010). 
3
 Id.  
4
 Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1486-87 (1987) (“Judicial doctrines of federal jurisdiction operate 
similarly to adjust—to redraw—the boundary that circumscribes the states’ independent 
functioning. The courts’ interpretive role regarding jurisdictional grants is well 
established. Although Congress initially prescribes the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
the courts themselves find extensive room for interpretation of these grants of 
jurisdiction.”); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 
2   
 
 
inclination of state courts to vindicate federal rights—the so-called “parity” 
problem.
5
 While there is an enormous literature committed to both of these 
questions, there is relatively modest attention paid to federal rights arising 
under international treaties.
 6
 Because treaties are increasingly used to 
impart and shape domestic rights—including parental rights—attorneys, 
judges, legislators, and scholars alike will benefit from understanding the 
alternatives available to Congress when allocating jurisdiction under 
treaties, as well as understanding the strength and form judicial resistance 
to those alternatives may take.
7
 
The 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (Hague Child Abduction Convention) vividly illustrates the 
tensions involved when the federal government uses treaties to regulate 
wider swaths of national and international problems.
8
 In plain terms, 
parents were increasingly taking their children across international borders 
in an attempt to obtain more favorable custody determinations. The treaty 
aimed to deprive the abducting parent of any advantage by requiring the 
return of the child, and in the case of visitation rights, to ensure respect for 
those rights.
9
 The United States signed the treaty in 1981 and Congress 
passed an implementing statute, the International Child Abduction 
                                                                                                                         
HARV. L. REV. 869, 870 (2011) (noting a “recurring concern among scholars of federal 
courts and federal jurisdiction that Article III is at war with itself”). 
5
 See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Barry Friedman, 
Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State 
Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211 (2004); Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 
53 B.C. L. REV. 953 (2012) (analyzing the state/federal disparity in the habeas corpus 
context). 
6
 Janet Koven Levit, A Tale of International Law in the Heartland: Torres and the Role 
of State Courts in Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 163, 
183-84 (2004) (referring to the “neglect” of state court management of treaties).  I use the 
adjective “international” to distinguish from treaties the United States concluded with 
Native American tribes. 
7
 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). In Golan, the US Supreme Court 
determined that Congress was empowered to move copyrighted works from the public 
domain back into private copyright holders’ possession through ratification of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), adopting as federal law certain treaty-based 
copyright protections. Plaintiff orchestra conductors, musicians, publishers, and others 
who formerly enjoyed free access to works removed from the public domain argued that 
the URAA violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of expression. The US 
Supreme Court, 6-2, held that the URAA survived First Amendment scrutiny because it 
was narrowly tailored to fit the national interest in protecting US copyright holders’ 
interests abroad. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 390, 396-98 (1998) (“Moreover, many of these treaties take the form of 
detailed multilateral instruments negotiated and drafted at international conferences.  
These treaties resemble and are designed to operate as international “legislation” binding 
on much of the world.”) (citations omitted); David Sloss, Domestic Application of 
Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 367 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012). 
8
 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Child Abduction Convention]. 
9
 Id. at art. 1. In the treaty, rights known as “visitation” rights in the United States are 
described as rights of “access.”. 
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Remedies Act (ICARA), in 1988.
10
 ICARA gave federal and state courts 
concurrent original jurisdiction over treaty claims and required them to 
respect each other’s judgments. Congress did not specify what federal 
courts should do when treaty claims appear in both federal and state court 
litigation. It should have. 
Parallel federal and state litigation occurs because state court plaintiffs 
join Hague Child Abduction Convention claims with their divorce and 
child custody petitions, and state court defendants raise treaty claims in 
their responsive pleadings.
11
 State court losers go to federal court to re-
litigate unfavorable rulings. Citing fundamental state interests, “wise 
judicial administration,” and clear Congressional acknowledgment as to 
the adequacy of state courts for vindicating rights under the treaty, federal 
district courts regularly deferred to state proceedings in which treaty 
claims initially appeared.
12
 Federal appellate courts overwhelmingly 
rejected these “abstention” decisions, emphasizing state courts’ role in 
making child custody determinations and the risk that they would 
prioritize that role over respecting the United States’ international 
obligations.
13
   
The separation of powers problem posed by these decisions is that 
federal courts are exercising jurisdiction over claims Congress allocated to 
state courts for good reasons. First, Congress desired to make available as 
many courts as possible to resolve treaty claims. Second, it sought to 
create an avenue by which state competence and expertise in family law 
could aid in the federal effort to meet treaty obligations. Federal courts’ 
exercise of jurisdiction over claims brought in state court is in tension not 
only with these objectives, but also with prudential doctrines favoring 
conservation of judicial resources and Congressional limitations on lower 
federal courts’ appellate jurisdiction over state judgments. The immediate 
injury to federal interests is the substantial delay caused by allowing 
parents to litigate in state court and then turn to federal court when they 
                                                 
10
 International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 (2013) 
[hereinafter ICARA]. 
11
 The applicability of the federal removal statute 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. is unclear 
under the implementing legislation. I speculate that it is rarely used because it would 
place the state court defendant at an evidentiary disadvantage under the statute. See Lops 
v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 965 (11th Cir. 1998) (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
federal removal policy applies to Hague claims); In re Mahmoud, No. 96-4165, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2158, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1997) (“The federal removal statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1441a authorizes removal by the defendant to federal court if original 
jurisdiction exists in the district court, except ‘as otherwise expressly provided.’ Neither 
the Hague Convention nor ICARA prohibits removal.”) (citations omitted). 
12
 See, e.g., Silverman v. Silverman, No. 00-2274 (PAM/JGL) (D. Minn. Nov. 13, 2000) 
(“He can and was afforded the opportunity to raise his Hague Convention petition in state 
court, but instead chose to file his petition in federal court—interestingly enough, on the 
same day as the state hearing.”). 
13
 See, e.g., Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 895 (8th Cir. 2003); Yang v. Tsui, 416 
F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005); Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2005); Holder v. 
Holder, 305 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2002). 
4   
 
 
are unhappy with the results. The treaty contemplates a six-week 
adjudication period.
14




The judicial federalism problem posed by these decisions is that, 
statutory parity notwithstanding, federal appellate courts are shaping 
jurisdiction under the treaty based on an implied Article III power to 
uphold the United States’ international obligations. In their view, state 
courts are less capable, less trustworthy, or both. State interests in 
administering their own judicial systems and family law regimes suffer as 
litigants use the federal courts to undermine state judicial authority. In the 
long term, the process by which federal appellate courts have narrowed 
state jurisdiction under the treaty is likely to reinforce the view that state 
courts are not legitimate participants in the application of international law. 
Congress clearly wanted state courts involved in the execution of the 
Hague Child Abduction Convention. Indeed, state courts’ participation 
makes sense as treaties increasingly regulate issue areas, like family law, 
where state control is generally assumed and preferred. Moreover, in the 
Hague Child Abduction Convention context, federal appellate decisions 
wrongly assume the worst. State judges order the return of children abroad 
at a slightly higher rate than federal judges and reject affirmative defenses 
under the treaty at a nearly identical rate.
16
     
I explore these arguments through two methods. First, qualitatively, I 
analyze federal appellate decisions reviewing federal district court 
decisions to abstain from hearing treaty claims in favor of state 
proceedings. Of course, one can always dispute the reasoning a court uses 
to reach its conclusions, and therefore dispute the conclusions themselves. 
However, in the case of Hague Child Abduction Convention abstention 
jurisprudence there is an identifiable pattern of federal appellate courts: (1) 
drawing a sharp distinction between custody and “habitual residence” 
under the treaty in order to reject abstention decisions, (2) narrowly 
construing a litigant’s invocation of the treaty in a state court proceeding, 
and (3) emphasizing the role of federal courts in upholding international 
commitments.
17
   
Second, quantitatively, I collected all reported cases in which federal 
and state judges adjudicated claims brought under the Hague Child 
Abduction Convention in order to test the hypothesis that state judges 
enforce international commitments less robustly than federal judges. If it 
were true that state judges favored domestic resolution of custody disputes 
                                                 
14
 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8. 
15
 NIGEL LOWE, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS MADE UNDER THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION (2011) (“It took far longer to conclude a case than the global average and 
this was found to be true for all outcomes in both return and access applications.”). 
16
 See infra Part IV. 
17
 See infra Part III. 
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in contravention of the treaty’s plan, we would observe state judges 
returning children abroad less frequently than federal judges. A state judge 
might achieve that outcome either through determining that the treaty was 
inapplicable or by applying one of the affirmative defenses available under 
the treaty to prevent return.   
Therefore, the empirical part of this article is a “parity” analysis. There 
is a large and controversial literature addressing parity between federal 
and state courts’ ability and inclination to vindicate federal rights.18 Most 
of this literature is devoted to federal constitutional and “domestic” 
statutory rights. But, there is some discussion of state courts’ willingness 
to enforce treaty rights, especially post-independence British creditors’ 
rights and recent cases involving the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations.
19
 However, in general, there have been few experiences with 
sufficient state judicial participation upon which a study might be 
undertaken.
20
   
The parity literature is therefore tilted in favor of abstract institutional 
characterizations over empirical analysis.
21
 This is understandable. One 
may extrapolate a set of expected behaviors resulting from life tenure, 
method of judicial selection, and, somewhat more arbitrarily, “technical 
                                                 
18
 Rene Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice 
System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 229, 253 (“There is a large 
literature on the relative merits of federal and state courts. These scholars are addressing 
the question of whether state courts are capable of adequately enforcing federal rights and 
of deciding diversity cases. Many writers have concluded that state judges are quite 
capable of handling these cases; a sizable contingent has argued the opposite.”). 
19
 See Neuborne, supra note 5. Both state and federal courts, for example, 
overwhelmingly rejected defendants’ claims that the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations imparted an individually enforceable right in a criminal proceeding. See also 
Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, From LaGrand and Avena to Medellin - A Rocky Road 
Toward Implementation, 14 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 27 (2005); Erik G. Luna & 
Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 147 (1999); Anna Maria 
Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: a Policy Analysis of Litigating International 
Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 139, 179 (2006). 
20
 David Sloss and Paul Stephan have argued, using both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, that courts are more likely to enforce international treaties against private 
parties than against the government. DAVID SLOSS, Treaty Enforcement in U.S. Courts: 
An Empirical Analysis in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (David Sloss ed., 2009); PAUL B. STEPHAN, Treaties in the 
Supreme Court, 1946-2000, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, 317-
52 (David Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey, and William Dodge, eds., 2009). These analyses do 
not distinguish between federal and state enforcement and, indeed, the latter is focused 
exclusively on US Supreme Court cases. 
21
 See Neuborne, supra note 5; Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional 
Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining 
a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 261-69 (1988); Brett 
Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower 
Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 233, 245-52 (1999). 
6   
 
 
competence.”22 While some scholars who have undertaken empirical 
analyses of federal and state court parity are at pains to emphasize the 
limited applicability of their findings,
23
 other scholars reject even the 
possibility of objectively comparing federal and state courts’ treatment of 
federal rights.
24
 Conceding these difficulties, this article nevertheless takes 
the view that in limited circumstances it is possible to draw meaningful 
conclusions from studies of reported cases. In the case of Hague Child 
Abduction Convention jurisprudence, the relatively limited universe of 
adjudications and the treaty’s young life improve the chance that a 
representative picture of federal and state judicial management will 
emerge.     
This argument implicates a wider theoretical debate on the law of 
federal jurisdiction in the treaty context, but also raises more immediate, 
practical questions about the effectiveness of ICARA’s jurisdictional 
scheme—questions that are especially important to resolve in light of the 
family law treaties now awaiting ratification and implementation. These 
latter questions are the focus of this article, which argues that ICARA has 
failed to effectively or efficiently balance federal and state interests. By 
granting concurrent original jurisdiction over Hague Child Abduction 
Convention claims, Congress invited the jurisdictional conflicts it claimed 
it hoped to avoid. Federal appellate decisions rejecting federal district 
courts’ abstention orders are not only inconsistent with the jurisdictional 
statute, they also mandate duplication of judicial resources and undermine 
state schemes constructed to protect children and effectively adjudicate 
treaty claims.
25
 I conclude by suggesting that, as the United States enters 
more family law treaties, as it is now poised to do, Congress consider the 
lessons of the Hague Child Abduction Convention when determining 
which courts are best suited to adjudicate family law claims. If it again 
decides that concurrent original jurisdiction between federal and state 
courts is best, Congress should make more explicit the standards by which 
federal courts may or must abstain.
 
 
Part I of this article provides background to both the increasing 
influence of international law on traditional state authority and the United 
States’ increased engagement with international family law treaties. Part II 
analyzes federal appellate decisions from the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal rejecting 
abstention under the treaty. Part III discusses the methodology used to 
                                                 
22
 See Neuborne, supra note 5; Jed Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial 
Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1143-44 (2010). 
23
 Gerry, supra note  21. 
24
 Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 236 (“[T]he debate about parity is unresolvable 
because parity is an empirical question for which there is no empirical answer.”). 
25
 See Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948) (requiring a federal court to 
give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as another court of that state 
would give); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
813-17 (1976). 
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study federal and state judicial management of Hague Child Abduction 
Convention claims. Part IV applies the lesson of Hague Child Abduction 
Convention abstention to family law treaties the United States has either 
signed or already ratified. Part V takes stock of recent US participation in 
family law treaties and provides a glimpse into the complications that the 
future may hold for federal court, state court, and treaty jurisdiction over 
family law. 
I. 
THE INCREASING INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON STATE LAW AND 
THE IMPLEMENTATION  OF THE HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION 
A. Constitutional Structure and Federal Treaties 
To understand the difficulties raised by concurrent jurisdiction in the 
Hague Child Abduction Convention context, it is necessary to review the 
constitutional framework for the implementation of treaties and the spread 
of international law into the tradionally state-dominated family law 
sphere.
26
 The US Constitution originated in significant part because the 
Articles of Confederation tolerated competition and conflict between the 
newly independent states in ways that threatened long-term unity and 
invited external interference.
27
 The Founders, as part of a relatively 
comprehensive displacement of state sovereignty over foreign relations, 
stripped away the states’ powers to conclude treaties and regulate foreign 
commerce and vested them in Congress and the President.
28
 For example, 
Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate 
foreign commerce and to define and punish offenses against the law of 
nations, and Article II provides for a joint treaty-making process between 
the President and the Senate.
 29
 As in the Articles of Confederation, states 
were prohibited from entering into any “agreement or compact” with a 
foreign power or engaging in war without Congressional consent.
30
  
                                                 
26
 See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original 
Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 369-90 
(1999). 
27
 Sam Foster Halabi, The Supremacy Clause as Structural Safeguard of Federalism: 
State Judges and International Law in the Post-Erie Era, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 
63, 64 (2013). 
28
 The Articles of Confederation had also attempted to limit state authority over foreign 
affairs with relatively limited success. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 
96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1446 (1987); Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh 
Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1050-51 
(2002) (“Because state legislatures—not Congress—were the original repositories of 
legislative sovereignty transferred from Parliament by revolution, the dogma of exclusive 
sovereignty (in thirteen iterations) stood as an impediment to the creation of a ‘more 
perfect Union.’”)  
29
 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Breard: The Abiding Relevance of 
Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 AM J. INT’L L. 675, 677-78 (1998) (noting 
limitations imposed on state foreign relations powers under the US Constitution). 
30
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 




Article III’s enumerated classes of Supreme Court jurisdiction 
established federal judicial control over disputes most likely to affect 
international relations.
31
 For example, maritime and admiralty disputes 
were fundamentally tied to both commercial and security interests of the 
United States as a unitary sovereign under the law of nations. Thus, the 
judicial power was always intertwined with the United States’ 
international obligations.
32
   
 
 Article VI of the Constitution bound state judiciaries to give effect to 
actions taken by the political branches in executing these functions.
33
 
However, initial state judicial resistance to the enforcement of British 
creditors’ treaty-based rights after independence established a long 
tradition of skepticism about whether state judges would robustly enforce 
international commitments—especially when doing so threatened 
important state interests.
34
 When states threatened the United States’ 
international obligations through executive, legislative, or judicial action, 
federal judges readily invalidated those measures by applying one of 




                                                 
31
 Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 




 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that federal authority over foreign affairs existed prior to and beyond the textual 
limits imposed by the US Constitution. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 
U.S. 304 (1936). Curtiss-Wright has never been overruled, but Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer is now regarded as the most 
important precedent as to the extent of federal foreign affairs authority flowing from 
delegated powers under Article I and Article II. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
34
 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 
54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1189 (2005); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 
(1816). 
35
 Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 
843 (2004). The authors note: 
The natural effect of making federal law supreme is that it overrides inconsistent 
state law. Indeed, preemption—and particularly foreign affairs preemption—was a 
central purpose of the clause, as explained in the founding era . . . The inclusion of 
treaties, as well as statutes, in the Supremacy Clause shows the extent to which the 
Constitution's framers focused upon state interferences in foreign affairs under the 
Articles. Perhaps the single greatest foreign affairs challenge under the Articles was 
that states refused to implement and abide by treaties negotiated by the national 
government. Id. 
See Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 573, 584 n.31 (2007) (“There is, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, a strong historical pattern of enforcement of treaties against the 
individual States of the United States.”). 
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There were both explicit and implicit safeguards built into the 
Constitution to prevent the abuse of international  lawmaking powers.
36
 
Explicitly, states enjoyed participation in Congress through their elected 
delegations—the “political safeguards of federalism” which protected 
state interests when Congress, for example, regulated foreign commerce or 
codified customary international law.
37
 With respect to treaties, for 
example, a super-majority of Senators were required to approve 
agreements entered into by the President.
38
 Implicitly, it was understood 
that treaties covered a relatively narrow class of national interests, limiting 
the areas for which this non-bicameral form of law-making might be 
used.
39
 The judiciary fashioned its own methods to enforce that implicit 
understanding, principally the doctrine of “self-execution”40 under which 
courts determined whether or not treaties required additional action from 




                                                 
36
 See Oona Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits (Yale Law 
Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 267, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2155179## (identifying structural 
limits on the treaty power); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE 
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 272-73 (2005). 
37
 David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1963 (2003). For the seminal contribution on the political safeguards of 
federalism, see Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of 
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. 
REV. 543 (1954). 
38
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
39
 David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000); Oona 
Hathaway et al., supra note 36 (“Madison conceded that ‘[t]he exercise of the power 
must be consistent with the object of the delegation,’ which was ‘the regulation of 
intercourse with foreign nations,’ and he agreed that the power did not include the power 
‘to alienate any great, essential right.’”). 
40
 Some treaties are “self-executing” which means no additional legislation from 
Congress is required to impart individually enforceable federal rights. Asakura v. City of 
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). The Court noted: 
 The rule of equality established by [the treaty] cannot be rendered nugatory in any 
part of the United States by municipal ordinances or state laws. It stands on the same 
footing of supremacy as do the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. It operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it 
will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts. Id. 
Curtis Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 656 (2000) 
(“Courts vary to some extent in the precise test they use to determine whether a treaty is 
self-executing. Typically, courts consider a variety of factors, such as the treaty’s 
language and purpose, the nature of the obligations that it imposes, and the domestic 
consequences associated with immediate judicial enforcement.”) 
41
 Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525-
26 (2008) (“The responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a 
non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”). Tim Wu traces the 
history of the non-self-execution doctrine in US jurisprudence to a 1788 Pennsylvania 
state court decision, Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 393, 403-04 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
1788). See Wu, supra note 35, at 594-95 n. 76. 
10   
 
 
History wrought a number of changes to this balance. The Civil 
War (and the Reconstruction Amendments that followed) extinguished a 
number of lingering constitutional questions regarding the preeminence of 
the national government over the states. Diminishing barriers to the 
movement of goods and people encouraged the national government to 
enter into a greater number of international agreements that coordinated, 
protected, and regulated interests implicated by these movements. These 
international agreements inevitably encroached upon states’ legal 
authority.
42
 The Supreme Court facilitated this encroachment. In 1921, it 
held in Missouri v. Holland that the federal government could accomplish 





 which was later reaffirmed on narrower preemption 
grounds in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, state statutes 
and administrative measures face a significant risk of preemption if they 
impose more than an “incidental effect” on foreign relations, even where 
they do not directly conflict with a treaty or federal statute.
 45
 Because 
state courts are, ex post, structurally empowered to harmonize treaties with 
state legal regimes, the expansion of federal power has placed them at the 
center of longstanding debates over the proper uses of treaties.
46
 
                                                 
42
 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (rejecting N.Y. State Insurance 
Commissioner’s receivership over assets held by nationalized Russian insurance 
company based on the preemptive effect of a sole executive agreement); Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 398, 441-
42 (1998) (describing areas where the federal government may use the treaty power to 
regulate in areas traditionally occupied by the states).  
43
 In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1921), the US Supreme Court decided that the 
federal government’s ability to make treaties, in that case, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 
is supreme over states’ rights arising under the Tenth Amendment.    
44
 Zchernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
45
 American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
46
 Sam Foster Halabi, supra note 27. State judges are especially influential given that they 
manage 95% of all litigation. C.J. Christine M. Durham, Utah Supreme Court, 2012 State 
of the Judiciary Address, available,at 
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/reports/statejudiciary/2012-StateOfTheJudiciary.pdf. 
The Connecticut Bar Journal, for example, surveys international law developments in 
Connecticut courts. Between 1993 and 2003, 60% of the reported decisions were from 
state courts compared with 40% from district courts or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. Thomas R. Phillips, State Supreme Courts: Local Courts in a Global 
World, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 557, 564 (2003). Alison LaCroix, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM, 172 (2010). The author notes:  
To be sure, the clause looked to the judges in the states to enforce this supreme law 
of the land. It thus set up a procedural overlap between the two levels of 
government . . . The judges might be nodes of connection between the functional 
levels of government, but their more significant role was as nodes of separation 
between the supreme (national, enumerated) law of the land and the (ordinary) state 
law that operated in all other contexts. Id. 
See Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (rejecting rights asserted under the 
U.N. Charter). 
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B. US Engagement with Family Law Treaties 
Family law is an area over which states have historically enjoyed 
virtually unfettered authority.
47
 Diplomatically, the United States 
protected state family law through reservations, understandings, and 
declarations stating that any international agreement was subject to 
principles of federalism or by rejecting agreements which overstepped 
traditional understandings of the division between federal and state 
authority.
48
 This was especially true of family law treaties,
 49
 which had 
long been a focus of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
an international organization committed to the harmonization and 
unification of choice of law rules.
 50
    
Major federal interventions into family law arose in part because some 
states abused this authority, giving little or no deference to family 
adjudications in other states, creating precisely the kind of full faith and 
credit problem the federal constitution was designed to address.
51
 
Aggrieved parents absconded with their children to haven states in search 
of a more favorable custody or maintenance determination.
52
 Judicially 
mandated child and family support obligations also emerged as an 
important barrier between self-sufficiency and eligibility for federal 
assistance. 
Over the last three decades, the federal government has increasingly 
regulated family law with a range of mandatory and permissive legal 
regimes aimed at these federal interests.
53
 For example, citing the 
                                                 
47
 See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1821 
(1995); Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a 
Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1831 (1987). 
48
 See, e.g., UN, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 Treaty Series 
171 (1966) (“That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented 
by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial 
jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local 
governments”).  
49
 Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 269-70 (2009) (“Until recently, family law was viewed 
as the province of state governments. In the tradition of dual federalism, states were 
sovereign in this area, and the national government played a relatively minor role.”); Ann 
Laquer Estin, Families and Children in International Law, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 276 (2002) (“Although the United States has participated in the 
Hague Conference since 1964, it has not ratified any of the marriage and divorce treaties, 
most likely because family law is understood in the United States to be a subject of state 
jurisdiction while international treaty-making is the province of the federal government.”). 
50
 Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26. 
51
 Stephen Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 
1242 (2009). 
52
 MAUREEN DABBAGH, PARENTAL KIDNAPPING IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL AND 
CULTURAL ANALYSIS (2012). 
53
 Estin, Sharing Governance, supra note 49, at 279-80 (2009) (“State laws governing 
paternity, adoption, foster care, child support, and child protection now evolve based on a 
12   
 
 
relationship between delinquent family maintenance obligations and 
federal welfare assistance, Congress imposed a mandatory regime that 
requires states to actively pursue individuals who are delinquent in family 
maintenance payments.
54
 With respect to child custody decisions, 
Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) to 
eliminate haven states by requiring state judges to defer to the continuing 
jurisdiction of any decree issued by a previous state judge with jurisdiction 
over the case.
55
 Although the PKPA itself does not provide mechanisms 
for enforcement, the PKPA makes the Federal Parent Locator Service 
available in all custody cases and makes the federal Fugitive Felony Act 
applicable to interstate child abductions.
56
 
The two interests that caused the federalization of certain aspects of 
family law domestically—recovery of maintenance obligations and 
elimination of haven states—also necessitated protection at the 
international level.
57
 As marriages between people from different 
countries became more common and families became more mobile, so did 
the need to reach parents in foreign countries when those marriages 
ended.
58
 As a result, the executive branch has shown greater openness to 
                                                                                                                         
federal design, as do laws regulating family behavior of individuals who receive federally 
supported welfare benefits. The cost of these programs to the national government shows 
a substantial federal commitment to family policy and children’s welfare.”). 
54
 Id. at 275-76, 282. Professor Estin notes:  
Following its first ventures into family policy in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, Congress claimed a more significant role with the Aid to Dependent 
Children program . . . this narrow focus began to widen in 1974 when Congress 
instituted a series of new programs to improve child support enforcement and 
paternity determination, protect children from neglect and abuse, and increase 
delinquency prevention efforts and improve state juvenile justice systems. Since 
1974, these programs have expanded significantly, with Congress frequently drawing 
on sources of authority beyond its spending power to legislate in a range of family 
law contexts . . . As the AFDC program expanded and national politics shifted, 
Congress began to search for  ways to contain or reduce costs. Id. (citations omitted). 
55
 Congress enacted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), and the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980), to assist 
parents to regain their children when unlawfully taken by the other parent. The PKPA 
reaffirms a court’s duty to give full faith and credit to a decree rendered by a state court 
and provides that a court of another state must defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
state that rendered the original decree. Congress specifically invoked its Article IV power 
to effect full faith and credit between the states. 
56
 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980); 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1998) (establishing the Federal Parent 
Locator Service (FPLS)); Caroline LeGette, International Child Abduction and the 
Hague Convention: Emerging Practice and Interpretation of the Discretionary Exception, 
25 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 287, 292-93 (1990) (describing Department of Health and Human 
Services’ use of FPLS). 
57
 See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism, Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe, 111 
YALE L.J. 619, 621 (2001) (challenging the assertion that family law is “truly” a subject 
of local jurisdiction and suggesting that globalization will engender greater US 
engagement with international and transnational family law). 
58
 Peter H. Pfund, Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal 
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10497 (Mar. 26, 1986) (“This country’s participation in 
the development of the Convention was a logical extension of U.S. membership in the 
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participation in treaties previously regarded as excessively intrusive into 
states’ family law authority. The United States has ratified the Hague 
Child Abduction Convention as well as the Hague Convention on 




The United States has signed (but not ratified) two additional 
treaties that upon adoption will regulate important aspects of state family 
law: the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, 
Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children;
60 
and the Convention on the 
International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family 
Maintenance.
 61
 The purpose of the first treaty is to protect children over 
whom citizenship, residency, and parental rights involve more than one 
state, and to “[avoid] conflicts between their legal systems in respect of 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of measures for 
the protection of children” through international cooperation and 
                                                                                                                         
Hague Conference on Private International Law and bipartisan domestic concern with 
interstate parental kidnapping, a phenomenon with roots in the high U.S. divorce rate and 
mobility of the population.”); National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, 
International Forum on Parental Child Abduction: Hague Convention Action Agenda 2 
(1999) in PHILIP SCHWARTZ, INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS (DeHart ed., 1993) 
(“This world-wide phenomenon is the consequence of ease of international travel and the 
multiplication of bi-national marriages, many of which suffer from cultural and religious 
friction, and the vulnerability of dual national children with two passports.”). 
59
 Hague Conference on International Private Law, Convention of 29 May 1993 on 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: Status 
table, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2011). Estin, Sharing Governance, supra note 49, at 83 (describing 
the long process involved in finalizing regulations and depositing the instrument of 
ratification). The United States signed the Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Convention) on March 
31, 1994.  The United States ratified the Convention on December 12, 2007, and the 
Convention entered into force on April 1, 2008. The implementing International 
Adoption Act’s (IAA) purpose is to “protect the rights of, and prevent abuses against 
children, birth families, and adoptive parents involved in adoptions (or prospective 
adoptions) subject to the Convention, and to ensure that such adoptions are in the 
children’s best interests,” and to “improve the ability of the Federal Government to assist 
United States citizens seeking to adopt children from abroad and residents of other 
countries party to the Convention seeking to adopt children from the United States.” 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 14901-14954 (West 2000). 
60
 Hague Conference on International Private Law, Convention of 19 October 1996 on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of 
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children: Status table, 
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=70 (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Hague Conference 1996]. 
61
  Hague Conference on International Private Law, Convention of 23 November 2007 on 
the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance: 
Status table, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=131 (last visited Nov. 14, 
2011) [hereinafter Hague Conference 2007]. 
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promotion of the “best interests of the child.”62 The second treaty aims to 
effectuate the “recovery of child support and other forms of family 
maintenance” in the international setting by establishing a system of 
cooperation between the contracting states, which will ensure that they 
make available applications for child support and other forms of family 
maintenance, recognize child support and other family maintenance orders, 
and effectively enforce the orders when necessary.
63
 
C. The Hague Child Abduction Convention and the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act 
Drafted in response to the growing phenomenon of parents in domestic 
disputes taking children across international borders in order to prejudice 
custody determinations, the Hague Child Abduction Convention requires 
the return of a child who was living in one party state, but was removed to 
or retained in another party state in violation of the left-behind parent’s 
custodial rights.
64
 Once returned, child custody can then be resolved in the 
courts of that jurisdiction.
65
 The Hague Child Abduction Convention does 
not authorize a court to determine the merits of the underlying custody 
claim.
66
 The court is limited to deciding whether the child should be 
returned to his or her state of habitual residence.
67
 The Hague Child 
Abduction Convention divides parental rights into “rights of custody” and 
                                                 
62
 Hague Conference 1996, supra note 60, preamble. 
63
 Hague Conference 2007, supra note 61, preamble. 
64




 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8, art. 16. See also ICARA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11601(a)(4) (1988). 
67
 See Karin Wolfe, A Tale of Two States: Successes and Failures of the 1980 Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in the United States 
and Germany, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 285, 302 (2000). The author noted:  
The child is then to be returned to the state of habitual residence—not to the 
custody of the left-behind parent—for judicial determination of custody over 
the child. Of course, the return of the child to the forum of habitual residence 
does not automatically trigger the application of that state's law to the 
proceedings. Rather conflict of laws rules and the possibility of the presence of 
the doctrine of renvoi within the lex fori determine the applicable law. The 
Child Abduction Convention establishes only the forum. Id.  
See also Julia A. Todd, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction: Are the Convention's Goals Being Achieved?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 553 (1995); Susan L. Barone, International Parental Child Abduction: A Global 
Dilemma With Limited Relief—Can Something More Be Done?, 95 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 
103, 104 (1995); Marianne Blair, International Application of the UCCJEA: Scrutinizing 
the Escape Clause, 38 FAM. L. Q. 547, 549-50 (2004). The determination of “habitual 
residence” itself has divided courts that have considered it. See, e.g., Silverman v. 
Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 895 (8th Cir. 2003) (ruling that “habitual residence” is a 
question of law); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001) (determining that 
“habitual residence” is focused on a factual analysis of parental intent subject to clear 
error review). 
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“rights of access.”68 Article 3 of the treaty by its terms limits a “wrongful” 
removal to one violating “rights of custody.”69 The Hague Child 
Abduction Convention does not mandate any specific remedy when a 
noncustodial parent has established interference with rights of access.
70
 
Rather, nations are instructed in Article 21 to “promote the peaceful 
enjoyment of access rights and the fulfillment of any conditions to which 
the exercise of those rights may be subject,” as well as to “take steps to 
remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such rights.”71 
The Reagan Administration, which signed the treaty, argued that 
claims brought under the treaty belonged exclusively in state courts 
because key aspects of the treaty implicated state expertise and state 
interests.
 72
  The original House bill, H.R. 3971, gave state courts 
jurisdiction over all actions requesting the return of an abducted child and 
vested federal district courts with jurisdiction “to the extent” a question of 
treaty interpretation or diversity of citizenship arose.
73
 The Senate, 
however, included concurrent, original federal and state jurisdiction both 
in its initial version of the law and as an amendment to the version 
eventually passed by both chambers.
74
 While it is difficult to identify the 
                                                 
68
 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8 (“The objects of the present 
convention are . . . to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one 
Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”). 
69
 Id. art. 3.  
70
 See, e.g., Viragh v. Fordes, 612 N.E.2d 241, 246-47 (Mass. 1993). In Viragh, the 
custodial parent moved with her two children from Hungary to the United States 
notwithstanding a Hungarian court’s award of visitation to the noncustodial parent.  
When she informed her ex-husband that she would not return to Hungary with the 
children, he brought an action in Massachusetts Family Court seeking enforcement of a 
right of return under the Hague Child Abduction Convention. The Family Court judge 
rejected the requested relief on the ground that the father’s rights were “rights of access,” 
not “rights of custody,” under the treaty and therefore ineligible for the return remedy.  
71
 Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (“One such remedy is a writ ordering 
the custodial parent who has removed the child from the habitual residence to permit, and 
to pay for, periodic visitation by the non-custodial parent with access rights.”) (citing 
Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 
10,494, 10,500 (March 27, 1986)). See also Daniel M. Fraidstern, Croll v. Croll and the 
Unfortunate Irony of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction: Parents with “Rights of Access” Get No Rights to Access Courts, 30 
BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 641 (2005); Viragh, 612 N.E. 2d at 246-47. 
72
 See International Child Abduction Act Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative 
Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong. (Feb. 3, 1988); 
International Child Abduction Act, Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts and 
Administrative Practice of the S. Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong. (Feb. 23, 1988); Linda 
Silberman, Hague International Child Abduction Convention: A Progress Report, 57 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 262-63 (1994). President Reagan signed the treaty on 
December 23, 1981, transmitted it to the Senate on October 30, 1985, and the Senate 
gave its advice and consent on October 9, 1986 subject to implementing legislation from 
Congress.   
73
 134 CONG. REC. S4704-04 (1988) (statement of Hon. Benjamin Cardin). 
74
 Id. See also Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: the Hague Childrens’ 
Conventions and the Case for International Family Law in the United States, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 47, 49 (2010). 
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reason, the Congressional record strongly hints that the State Department’s 
skepticism toward state judicial enforcement explains the Senate 
position.
75
    
Both chambers were clear on the issue of state competence, expertise, 
and interest. Then-Representative Ben Cardin emphasized: 
[W]e have no intention of expanding Federal court jurisdiction into the 
realm of family law. In fact, Congress reaffirms its view that States 
have traditionally had, and continue to have, jurisdiction and expertise 
in the area of family law. Here we are not intruding into this 
jurisdiction. Rather, we are simply providing through simple and 
unambiguous language that in the special circumstance where 
international child abduction is alleged, both the Federal and State 
courts should be available to resolve the claims. As a matter of fact, 
the State courts will often provide the best fora for these cases because 
their backlogs are often substantially less than those of the Federal 
courts in many parts of the country.
76
 
Senator Orrin Hatch noted the treaty’s “custody-related questions” were 
“traditionally . . . handled by the states,” but encouraged passage of the 
law despite the “close question” of federal or state jurisdiction.77 Congress 
appeared to embody this intent with 42 U.S.C. § 11603(g), which provides 
that:  
Full faith and credit shall be accorded by the courts of the States and 
the courts of the United States to the judgment of any other such court 
ordering or denying the return of a child, pursuant to the Convention, 
in an action brought under this Act.
78
 
Congress also authorized courts to enter provisional remedies to prevent 
harm to children and prejudice to parental rights: 
Limitation on authority. No court exercising jurisdiction of an 
action  . . . may . . . order a child removed from a person having 
physical control of the child unless the applicable requirements of 
State law are satisfied.
79
 
The implementing legislation additionally directed the President to 
establish a “Central Authority” for cooperating with other contracting 
                                                 
75
 See Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT’L. L. 247 (2012) 
(detailing the Senate’s bargaining options with respect to multilateral treaties). 
76
 Cardin, supra note 73. 
77
 134 CONG. REC. 6356, 6484 (1988) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
78
 ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(g) (1988). 
79
 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11604(b) (West 2013). See also International Child Abduction 
Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 2673 and H.R. 3971 Before the Subcommittee on Admin. 
Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 30 
(1988) (statement of Peter Pfund, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International Law, 
Department of State) (“The federal legislation seeks to intrude as little as possible on 
relevant aspects of State law and procedure.”). 
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states with respect to upholding treaty obligations, reporting to Congress 
and the Hague Conference, and coordinating across agencies. ICARA’s 
principal purpose, however, is to regulate judicial proceedings under the 
treaty.
80
    
Under ICARA, any person seeking the return of a child may 
commence a civil action by filing a petition in a court authorized to 
exercise jurisdiction in the place where the child is located.
81
  The 
petitioner bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that a child’s removal or retention was wrongful.82 The respondent must 
show by clear and convincing evidence that one of a limited number of 
exceptions apply. ICARA grants to state courts and US district courts 
“concurrent original jurisdiction of actions arising under the 
Convention.”83 The statute made only modest modifications to the treaty 
text, requiring simply that courts “shall decide the case in accordance with 
the Convention.”84 
                                                 
80
 While Congress viewed ICARA as an implementing statute, the State Department took 
the position that the treaty was self-executing and therefore ICARA was “facilitating” 
legislation. See John Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. 
INT’L. L. 655 n. 45 (2010). 
81
 ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (1988). 
(1) A petitioner in an action brought under [the treaty] shall establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence— 
 (A) in the case of an action for the return of a child, that the child has been 
wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention; and 
 (B) in the case of an action for arrangements for organizing or securing the effective 
exercise of rights of access, that the petitioner has such rights. 
(2) In the case of an action for the return of a child, a respondent who opposes the return 
of the child has the burden of establishing— 
 (A) by clear and convincing evidence that one of the exceptions set forth in article 
13b or 20 of the Convention applies; and 
 (B) by a preponderance of the evidence that any other exception set forth in article 
12 or 13 of the Convention applies. Id.  
Most often claimed is that the child’s return would result in grave danger of 
psychological harm. Id. § 11603(e)(1)(A)-(2)(A). See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 
1060, 1063-64 (6th Cir. 1996); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 221 (3rd Cir. 1995). 
82
 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8. Article 13b provides that a court 
may refuse to return a child where there is a grave risk of physical or psychological harm 
or placement of the child in an intolerable situation. Article 20 allows a court to refuse to 
return a child where doing so would violate the requested state’s principles regarding 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Article 12 imposes a one-year time limit under 
which the remedy of return is most readily available, while the remaining exceptions 
under Article 13 apply to acquiescence in the removal or the child’s objection where a 
sufficiently mature child meaningfully objects to the return. When Congress codified the 
treaty, it placed differing evidentiary burdens on parties seeking return or invocation of 
one or more exceptions.  See ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(b) (West 2013). 
83
 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(a) (West 2013). 
84
 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. 11603(d) (West 2013). 
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Under the treaty, judges may refuse to order return of a child through 
two principal means. Article 3 of the Hague Child Abduction Convention 
gives left-behind parents a right to have a child returned if: (1) a child’s 
removal from a contracting state is “wrongful” and (2) the removal “is in 
breach of rights of custody.”85 Judges may therefore render the treaty 
inapplicable by determining that a removal was not “wrongful” or that a 
left-behind parent did not have “rights of custody,” which are 
characterized (but not defined) in the treaty. For example, if a court 
determines that a left-behind parent’s rights are actually rights of visitation, 
and not custody, then the parent would not have a right to have a child 
returned. Similarly, if a taking parent traveled to a foreign country with a 
child, a left-behind parent would not have a right to have the child 
returned if a judge determined that the taking parent was traveling with the 
consent of the left-behind parent or pursuant to a custody agreement 
because the removal would not be “wrongful.”86 
Assuming the treaty applies and a left-behind parent has established a 
wrongful removal in breach of rights of custody, judges still might not 
order removal under one of the aforementioned affirmative defenses. For 
example, if a left-behind parent fails to prosecute a Hague Child 
Abduction Convention claim in a year and the court determines that the 
child had settled in his or her new environment, the treaty permits the 
court to refuse to return the child.
87
 A judge may also refuse return where 
a parent shows by clear and convincing evidence that the other parent 
acquiesced in the removal, or that the removal would pose a grave risk of 
physical or psychological harm to the child of placing the child in an 
“intolerable situation,” or would violate the repatriating state’s view of 




FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT ABSTENTION UNDER THE HAGUE ABDUCTION 
CONVENTION 
Hague Child Abduction Convention petitioners may file with the State 
Department as well as raise a treaty claim before a state and/or federal 
court. Indeed, part of the problem with the treaty as it functions in the 
United States is that petitioners often file in all three of these 
uncoordinated fora.
89
   
                                                 
85
 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8, art. 3. 
86
 See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001) (outlining inquiries a court 
should undertake when determining whether a removal is wrongful). 
87
 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8, art. 12. 
88
 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8, art. 13a, 13b, 20. 
89
 See Eric Lesh, Jurisdiction Friction and the Frustration of the Hague Convention: Why 
International Child Abduction Cases Should be Heard Exclusively by Federal Courts, 49 
FAM. CT. REV. 170, 174 (2010) (attributing the slowness of American adjudications to the 
frequent occurrence of parallel litigation).  
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 ICARA invites jurisdictional tensions between state courts, where 
Hague Child Abduction Convention claims are brought in conjunction 
with divorce and child custody actions, and federal courts, where state 
court defendants may bring original actions as federal plaintiffs. Litigants 
have exploited this procedural structure to introduce treaty claims at the 
state court level, and then use federal court litigation to re-litigate 
unfavorable state court orders. 
 
 Where Hague Child Abduction Convention claims appear in state 
litigation, federal district courts have used both formal and informal 
methods to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction. In Aldogan v. Aldogan, 
for example, the federal district court held a hearing in order to determine 
if either party objected to a state family court having the first opportunity 
to decide the Hague Child Abduction Convention claim because the court 
already had jurisdiction over the underlying child custody suit.
90
 Both 
parties assented to the transfer.
91
 Federal district courts have also applied 
formal abstention doctrines permitting, and in some circumstances 
requiring, deference to state court proceedings.
92
 Based on the statutory 
scheme, and where other criteria are met, dismissal in favor of state 
adjudication would not appear to threaten federal interests under the 
treaty.
93
 Certainly, where state court proceedings have advanced beyond 
the pleading stage, avoidance of duplication and waste as well as comity 
and federalism concerns would weigh in favor of dismissal.
94
 These 
represent the contexts in which federal district courts have declined 
jurisdiction in favor of state family, juvenile, or general trial court 
proceedings, roughly corresponding to Colorado River, Rooker-Feldman, 
and Younger abstention.
95
   
                                                 
90
 Aldogan v. Aldogan, No. 03cv 11837, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4811 (D. Mass. Dec. 10, 
2003). 
91
 Id.  
92
 See infra Part II-A. 
93
 Witherspoon v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 646 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 10, 2009). 
94
 Ion Hazzikostas, Note, Federal Court Abstention and the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 432 (2004) (abstaining based on Colorado River: the 
inconvenience of the federal forum, piecemeal litigation, and the California state courts 
had obtained jurisdiction long before the federal forum). 
95
 While it has not yet come before a district court, Burford abstention may also be 
warranted given the specialized courts many states have established to adjudicate family 
law claims, the conditions under which state departments of child, family, and social 
services are authorized to intervene on behalf of children, and the allocation of 
jurisdiction between juvenile courts, family courts, and general jurisdiction trial courts.  
See Ankenbrandt ex rel. L.R. v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705-06 (1992) (“It is not 
inconceivable, however, that in certain circumstances, the abstention principles 
developed in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), might be relevant in a case 
involving elements of the domestic relationship even when the parties do not seek 
divorce, alimony, or child custody. This would be so when a case presents ‘difficult 
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose 
importance transcends the result in the case then at bar.’”). 




 Federal district courts have often referred to state interests in child 
custody adjudication as the state interest justifying abstention. It is almost 
certainly true that a state’s interest in an initial custody determination is 
insufficient to justify abstention. Child custody determinations are, by 
nature, case specific. In any event, the Hague Child Abduction Convention 
bars final decisions on the merits of custody disputes until the removal 
claim is resolved.
96 
Yet, child custody inquiries frequently implicate other 
arguably more relevant state schemes for assessing a child’s maturity and 
risk of psychological or physical harm as well as use of temporary or 
foster care pending resolution of Hague Child Abduction Convention or 
custody claims.
97
 With respect to custody arrangements in which state 
courts have already established original and continuing jurisdiction, state 
interests in those determinations are more developed.
98
 These factors 
matter because abstention decisions under Younger and Colorado River 
frequently turn on the presence of state interests or the application of state 
law in parallel state proceedings.
99
 In addition to safeguarding state 
interests in family law schemes and in the administration of their judicial 
systems, abstention furthers treaty interests in the efficacious adjudication 
of removal claims.
100
   
 
                                                 
96
 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8, art. 16; Centenaro v. Poliero, 901 
N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct. 2009). 
97
 Bouvagnet v. Bouvagnet, No. 01 C 4685, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17095, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 
2001) (“Finally, the Court notes that the proceedings here are somewhat similar because 
the evidence that will be used to determine whether the children are settled in their new 
environment, a determination required by the Hague Convention under the present 
circumstances, will also be used for the required determination of the best interests of the 
children in the custody proceedings.”). 
98
 See, e.g., Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2005). In Gaudin, the 
Hawaii state court had entered a determination that return of children to Canada would 
“pose a grave risk of psychological harm” under the treaty. While the district court did 
not, and was not asked to, abstain in favor of state proceedings, it did rely on the state 
court “grave risk” determination. 
99
 See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 646 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 
1180 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Federalism gives states authority over matters of marriage, 
family, and child welfare. This case deals with those interests . . . the state proceeding 
gives Ms. Witherspoon an adequate opportunity to raise the issues she seeks to raise here 
in federal court.”); Grieve v. Tamerin No. 00-3824, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12210 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2000) (holding that Younger abstention was appropriate where the 
petitioner had filed a Hague Convention petition in state court previous to filing it in 
federal court); Cerit v. Cerit, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Haw. 2002) (ruling that it was 
appropriate to abstain from ruling on a Turkish man’s ICARA petition when he had 
already made an ICARA argument in Hawaii state court)  Contra Hazbun Escaf v. 
Rodriquez, 191 F. Supp. 2d 685, 688, 692 (E.D. Va. 2002) (criticizing Cerit and denying 
motion to dismiss based on abstention). 
100
 Ann Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interests in Abstention Cases: 
Observations on the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051, 1053 
(1988) (arguing that abstention should be applied when it advances federal interests). 
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A. Federal District Court Abstention in Hague Abduction Convention 
Cases 
 Federal district courts have deferred to state courts under three 
principal doctrines—Younger, Colorado River, and Rooker-Feldman. 
These doctrines are briefly summarized below and discussed in the context 
of the typical circumstances under which they are invoked. The factual 
backgrounds of the cases are provided to emphasize the usefulness of 
abstention in furthering both federal and state interests under the treaty.   
  
1. Younger Abstention Based on State Custody and Dependency Interest 
 
 In Younger v. Harris, a California criminal defendant brought an initial action 
for injunctive relief in federal district court instead of raising a First Amendment 
defense in his state criminal prosecution.
101
 The district court issued the injunction 
and invalidated California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act for unconstitutional 
vagueness.
102
 The Supreme Court reversed.
103
 Speaking through Justice Black, the 
Court emphasized that Congress had historically allowed few and minor 
exceptions allowing federal courts to interfere with state proceedings and that:  
 
This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred 
to by many as “Our Federalism,” and one familiar with the profound 
debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to 
respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of “Our 
Federalism.” The concept does not mean blind deference to “States’ 
Rights” any more than it means centralization of control over every 
important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers 
rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in 
which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and 
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious 
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal 
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere 




Younger has been controversial since it was decided.
105
 The Anti-Injunction Act 
of 1793 prohibited federal courts from issuing anti-suit injunctions against state 
proceedings unless “expressly authorized by an Act of Congress.”106 In Younger, 
that exception was asserted to be the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
107 
Even assuming 
                                                 
101
 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
102




 Id. at 44. 
105
 Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: an Empirical Perspective, 
12 NEV. L.J. 1 (2011). 
106
 Mark Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses in the Law of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 1301, 1304-05 (1978) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
decision not to decide Younger as a statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act). 
107
 Id. 
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federal courts obtained equitable jurisdiction over a state proceeding under that 
exception, they may still refuse to issue an injunction for the same reason courts 
sitting in equity often refuse to do so—there is already an adequate remedy at law. 
Justice Black’s opinion might be read narrowly to establish the scope of the 
“irreparability” inquiry federal courts must undertake when asked to enjoin state 
proceedings.
108
 A second, broader reading suggests that Justice Black’s opinion is 
actually based upon a general Article III responsibility given to federal courts to 
ensure the protection of federal rights while interfering as little as possible with 
state courts.
109
 It is fair to say that, at least in Justice Black’s view, federal courts 
may not equitably enjoin a state criminal proceeding where it poses no imminent 
or irreparable threat to a state defendant’s ability to vindicate a federal right.110 
The Supreme Court extended Younger abstention to state civil proceedings in 
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
111
 and state family law proceedings in Moore v. Sims.
112
 
While federal appellate courts have diverged in the precise wording of Younger 
criteria and the depth of involvement required by states and their agencies, three 
general inquiries have emerged in the Hague Child Abduction Convention 
context: (1) there is a judicial proceeding to which the federal plaintiff is a party 
and with which the federal proceeding will interfere, (2) the state proceeding must 
implicate important state interests, and (3) the state proceeding must afford an 
adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.
113
 Federal district courts have 
abstained under this doctrine to preserve state interests in maintaining the 
integrity of their judicial systems and their interests in using dependency systems 
to protect minors from abuse. 
a. Witherspoon v. Orange County Department of Social Services 
 
 In Witherspoon v. Orange County Department of Social Services, a 
mother attempted to use litigation in federal court to undermine a state 
court order entered to protect her children. Danny Witherspoon brought a 
divorce suit in state court and sought custody over two minor children 




 Peter W. Low, John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Curtis Bradley, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 718-19 (7th ed. 2011) (noting the unclear scope of 
Black’s “comity” analysis); Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The 
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1154 (1974). 
110
 Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (“The accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in 
the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, 
unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.”). 
111
 Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1969). 
112
 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979). In Pennzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987), the 
U.S. Supreme Court extended Younger abstention to a state’s fundamental interest in 
“administering certain aspects of their judicial systems.”  In 2013, the U.S. Supreme 
Court narrowed the applicability of Younger in  Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 
although it appears that even within its narrower confines it would easily protect actions 
by state agencies to protect children as in Witherspoon. 
113
 See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n., 457 U.S. 423 (1982); 
Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005). 
The Hague Child Abduction Treaty 23 
 
after they had been returned to him from Germany.
114
 Their mother, a US 
soldier, had taken them to a hospital where they showed signs of 
mistreatment, and Ms. Witherspoon, demonstrating “intoxicated, hostile, 
and bizarre” behavior, threatened to harm herself and the children.115 Ms. 
Witherspoon raised a claim under the Hague Child Abduction Convention 
in that proceeding, arguing that the children’s habitual residence was 
Germany, which was therefore the jurisdiction for any custody dispute.
116
 
In a parallel proceeding, a California juvenile court ordered the state to 
take temporary custody of the children, placing them first in a shelter and 




 The state court agreed with Ms. Witherspoon that Germany was the 
children’s habitual residence under the treaty because the children had 
lived and attended school there for the previous four years.
118
 On appeal, a 
California appellate panel determined that the trial judge had failed to 
adequately consider the exceptions to return under the treaty—especially 
Article 13b’s “grave risk” exception.119 The appellate panel further 
ordered the state court to stay proceedings pending the resolution of the 
juvenile dependency proceeding.
120
 The juvenile court ultimately 
determined the children to be dependents of the state and adopted a plan 
for both parents that included therapy and classes.
121
 The juvenile court 




 Ms. Witherspoon subsequently filed a Hague Child Abduction 
Convention petition in federal district court, requesting immediate return 
of the children to Germany.
123
 The federal district judge abstained under 
Younger: 
 
This case concerns domestic relations, conflicts between fathers and 
mothers, and the state’s role ensuring the health and welfare of the 
Minors . . . States allocate considerable resources to family and 
juvenile courts so they can effectively navigate these often troubled 
                                                 
114
 Witherspoon v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 646 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 
(C.D. Cal. 2009). 
115




 See In re Marriage of Witherspoon, 155 Cal. App. 4th 963 (2007). 
118
 Witherspoon, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. 
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 Id. “[The grave risk exception] is the most widely litigated defense to an application 
for return of a child to his or her place of habitual residence.” Michael R. Walshand & 
Susan W. Savard, International Child Abduction and the Hague Convention, 6 BARRY L. 
REV. 29, 38 (2006). 
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 Id. at 1179. 
123
 Id. 
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waters. State courts have access to child welfare and social workers, 




Noting cases in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had rejected 
Rooker-Feldman, Younger, and Colorado River abstention, the district 
judge observed that “the juvenile court proceedings that have delayed the 
ICARA proceedings are not custody proceedings, but dependency 
proceedings.
125
 The purpose of custody proceedings is to determine which 
parent, or private party, should retain custody of children.
126
 In contrast, a 
juvenile court initiates dependency proceedings to determine if the state—
not private individuals—should have custody of children to shield them 
from harm.”127 
b. Barzilay v. Barzilay 
 In Barzilay v. Barzilay, the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, 
Missouri entered a divorce decree that dissolved the marriage between two 
Israeli citizens, Sagi and Tamar Barzilay, and provided joint custody for 
their three minor children.
128
 The Barzilays had moved to Missouri in 
2001 and divorced in 2005.
129
 The children had lived in Missouri since 
                                                 
124
 Id. at 1180. 
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 Id. at 1181. See also Grieve v. Tamerin, No. 00-CV-3824 JG, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12210 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2000) aff’d on other grounds, Grieve v. Tamerin, 69 F.3d 149 
(2d Cir. 2001) (citing Neustein v. Orbach, 732 F. Supp. 333, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)) 
(quoting Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1976) (Oakes, J., concurring) (“In 
this narrow area of law [child custody], we should be especially careful to avoid 
unnecessary or untimely interference with the State's administration of its domestic 
policies.”). The federal district court noted: 
At oral argument, Grieve’s new counsel contended that his client had made no 
Hague Convention application to the state court. That contention is contradicted by 
Exhibit T, which is a July 24, 2000, letter from Grieve to Justice Garson stating that 
he made the Hague Convention application in May and asking for a written decision 
on the application. (The fact that Grieve did not use the word “petition,” the term of 
art used the in Convention is immaterial, especially given Grieve’s pro se status at 
the time.) Counsel’s assertion is further contradicted by Paragraph 25 of his client’s 
declaration, dated July 27, 2000, in which he states: “Recently, I brought an Order to 
Show Cause, in the State Supreme Court, requesting the Court to invoke the 
provisions of the Hague Convention, and return my passport so that my son may be 
returned to me and we can go back home. This was despite my objections, when 
acting pro se, that this delay was in contravention of the Hague Agreement and 
Article 11, which requests expeditious consideration thereof. . . . I have also 
requested a ‘Statement of Reason’ from the Hon. Judge Gerald Garson (Exhibit T), 
asking him to give reason for the delay in making a decision regarding a previous 
attempt to invoke the Hague Convention, in terms of Article 11 of the Convention.” 
Id. at *4 n.1.  
128
 Barzilay v. Barzilay, No. 4:07CV01781 ERW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89304 (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 4, 2007). 
129
 Id. 
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2001; the younger two had never lived in Israel.
130
 During the children’s 
visit to Israel during 2006, Sagi Barzilay secured an order from an Israeli 
court prohibiting the children’s return to the United States, which he used 
to secure a modified visitation schedule with the children and an 
agreement from Tamar to repatriate to Israel with the children by August, 
2009.
131
 When she returned to the United States, she filed a motion with 
the Circuit Court of St. Louis to modify the divorce decree to restrict 
Sagi’s access to the minor children based in part on the Hague Child 
Abduction Convention.
132
 Sagi filed a motion to dismiss Tamar’s state 
petition also based on the treaty.
133
 One day after the state court 
determined that the children’s habitual residence was the United States, 
denying Sagi’s ICARA claim, Sagi filed a suit in the US District Court for 





 The federal district court dismissed the claim, concluding that the final 
state order left Sagi’s only available course of action appeal in the 
Missouri courts.
135
 Although the district court did not specifically invoke 
Younger, and, indeed, the procedural history suggests the application of 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court focused on the presence of 
the Hague Child Abduction Convention issues in an ongoing state custody 
proceeding, the relatively flagrant attempt to undermine the state custody 
determination through the use of foreign judicial process, and Congress’s 
clear intent that state courts share jurisdiction over Hague Child Abduction 




2. Advanced State Proceedings and Abstention under Colorado River 
 
Unlike Younger abstention, the Colorado River doctrine is prudential and 
discretionary, and is driven in significant part by arguments disfavoring piecemeal 
litigation or duplication of judicial resources.
137
 Indeed, it is not technically a 
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136
 Id. at *10. 
137
 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
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form of “abstention” at all,138 but history and judicial shorthand have eclipsed the 
nominal distinction.
139
  In Colorado River, the state of Colorado had divided the 
major water basins within its territory into seven districts for purposes of 
adjudicating disputes over water rights.
140
 The United States filed suit in federal 
district court to protect its own water rights and those under its authority.
141
 After 
the United States filed suit, a defendant filed a motion in Colorado state court 
seeking to join the federal government as a defendant in a state court proceeding, 
adjudicating the rights of all parties in Colorado’s District 7.142 Congress had 
specifically authorized such joinder.
143
 Several defendants then filed a motion to 
dismiss the federal action on abstention grounds.
144
 The US Supreme Court 
upheld the district court’s decision to abstain.145 Rejecting the application of 
existing abstention doctrines, Justice Brennan nevertheless justified dismissal of 
the government’s suit on the basis of “wise judicial administration” and 
“conservation of judicial resources” based on Congress’s assent to joinder in state 
court on a matter in which states maintain “comprehensive state systems for 
adjudication of water rights . . .” 146  
Beyond Congressional intent, the Court also noted the preliminary nature of 
proceedings in the federal district court—the extensive “involvement of state 
water rights occasioned by this suit naming 1,000 defendants,” and the “300-mile 
distance between the District Court in Denver and the court in Division 7”.147 
Where parallel state proceedings exist, federal appellate courts have interpreted 
these parts of the Brennan opinion to require consideration of at least six factors 




(1) [W]hether one of the courts has assumed jurisdiction over any property 
in issue; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the potential for 
piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained 
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 Justice Brennan’s majority and Justice Stewart’s dissent both rejected the application 
of existing abstention doctrines. 
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 Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927 n. 21 (11th Cir. 1998) (“However, since prior decisions of 
this court label a federal court's deference to a parallel state court litigation as a type of 
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 Id. at 807. 
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 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1952). 
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 Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 
99, 104 (1986) (“Confronted with a list of ambiguous and overly broad factors, many 
lower courts have inferred that the Supreme Court has implicitly approved abstention 
from adjudicating properly filed federal cases if the facts can colorably be focused by the 
exceptional circumstances lens.”); Michael Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of 
Federal Courts, 60 N.C.L. REV. 59 (1981) (describing as “arbitrary” the division between 
permissible and impermissible abstention decisions). 
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jurisdiction; (5) whether federal or state law will be applied; and; (6) the 
adequacy of each forum to protect the parties’ rights.149 
 
Congress’s plan to distribute treaty jurisdiction between state and federal 
courts mirrors several aspects of the distribution of authority which led to the US 
Supreme Court’s decision in Colorado River.  Particularly in cases that have been 
extensively adjudicated in state courts, Colorado River strongly suggests that 
federal courts should dismiss petitions filed by state court parties in parallel 
litigation. 
a. Holder v. Holder 
In Holder v. Holder, Jeremiah Holder sought the return of his children 
to Germany, where he was stationed with the US Army.
150
 His wife Carla 
had left Germany with their two sons during what he thought to be a 
vacation in Washington State.
151
 Jeremiah filed for divorce and custody in 
California, where he and Carla had met and where their two children had 
been born.
152
 The California court ordered mediation regarding a custody 
and visitation plan.
153
 Jeremiah consented to the arrangement proposed by 
the mediator, which provided Carla with custody of the children in 
Washington and became part of the state trial court custody order on 
August 9, 2000.
154
 Jeremiah then obtained new counsel and filed a motion 
to reconsider the California order.
155
 At the hearing for reconsideration, 
Holder’s counsel informed the state court that he had filed a Hague Child 
Abduction Convention petition with the US State Department, to which 
the state court judge noted that Carla would be allowed to brief and argue 
the Hague claim since Holder had raised it.
156
 The trial court raised the 
Hague Child Abduction Convention issue four times in the course of the 




Jeremiah then filed a Hague Child Abduction Convention petition in 
the US District Court for the Western District of Washington at the same 
time that he appealed the initial California custody order.
158
 In the petition, 
he asserted that Germany was the children’s habitual residence under the 
treaty and that therefore German courts should adjudicate custody.
159
 The 
federal district judge abstained under Colorado River, determining that 
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California state courts had obtained jurisdiction before the US district 
court, and that the litigation of the Hague Child Abduction Convention 
claim in Washington would be both inconvenient and result in piecemeal 
litigation. While the treaty was federal law, Congress had vested both 
federal and state courts with original jurisdiction over treaty claims.
160
 
Under California waiver law, Holder had abandoned his treaty claim when 
he failed to bring it with his divorce and custody action. “Comity and 
federalism” required deference to the California judgment because Holder 
had used the treaty to get a “second bite at the custody apple.”161   
b. Cerit v. Cerit 
 In Cerit v. Cerit, the federal plaintiff had initially filed his Hague Child 
Abduction Convention petition as part of his answer in state court divorce 
proceedings.
162
 After the state judge ordered hearings on the children’s 
habitual residence, appointed a guardian ad litem to investigate the 
psychological harm exception, and entered an order granting temporary 
custody to the state court plaintiff, the federal plaintiff filed a treaty 
petition in the US District Court for the District of Hawaii.
163
 The district 
court abstained, noting that the state court had undertaken significant 
effort toward resolution of the treaty claim and that the federal plaintiff 
“vigorously litigated his ICARA petition in state court for three months 
prior to seeking resolution of the matter in federal court.”164 The court also 
noted: “[it] appears from the record that petitioner, unhappy with the 
proceedings in state court, is attempting to obtain a different result from 
the federal court.”165 
c. Copeland v. Copeland 
In Copeland v. Copeland, Berengere Copeland filed a Hague Child 
Abduction Convention claim in her response to Sean Copeland’s divorce 
and custody suit in North Carolina state court.
166
 The state court denied 
her petition and granted temporary custody to Sean. Berengere then filed a 
treaty petition in the US District Court for the Western District of North 
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Id. (The federal district judge also abstained under Younger, noting Hawaii’s 
specialized family court system was “especially implicated” in deciding to abstain from 
hearing a Hague Abduction Convention petition.”). 
166
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The federal district court abstained under Colorado River, determining 
that not only had the state court proceeding commenced two years before 
the federal action, but that “abstention would promote the objective of 
avoiding piecemeal litigation.”168 The federal district court emphasized 
that, although the case involved a treaty, it did not involve foreign 
relations subject matter typically associated with federal courts’ greater 




3. Abstaining in Deference to State Judgments under Rooker-Feldman 
 
As with Colorado River, Rooker-Feldman is not strictly speaking an 
abstention device. The doctrine, which takes its name from two US Supreme 
Court cases decided 60 years apart, prohibits litigants from using federal courts to 
re-litigate issues they lost in state court proceedings. Rooker-Feldman erects a 
jurisdictional bar to lower federal courts’ review of state court judgments based 
on Congress’s decision to vest only the US Supreme Court with appellate 
jurisdiction over those judgments.
170
 
In Rooker, two Indiana residents sought to have a federal district court declare 
“null and void” a state court judgment against them on the bases that it gave effect 
to an unconstitutional state statute and failed to follow prior Indiana precedent.
171
 
The district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the 
Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that Congress had chosen to vest appellate 
jurisdiction in the US Supreme Court only.
172
 The Rooker doctrine, such that it 
was, remained fallow for most of the next sixty years.   
In 1983, the Supreme Court rejected federal jurisdiction over claims by two 
applicants to the District of Columbia bar who, in order to sit for the exam, faced 
a special requirement for graduates of unaccredited law schools.
173
 This special 
requirement allowed a graduate of an unaccredited law school (or, in Feldman’s 
case, Virginia’s alternative attorney credentialing system) to sit for the bar exam 
“only after receiving credit for 24 semester hours of study in a law school that at 
the time was approved by the ABA . . .”174 There was a waiver process for this 
requirement, but the DC Court of Appeals had ended that waiver program shortly 
before the plaintiffs applied to sit for the exam.
175
 They challenged the waiver 
denial and the underlying requirement in federal district court as a violation of 
both constitutional rights and antitrust laws.
176
 The district court dismissed for 




 See Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 
YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995) (noting scholars who advocate federal jurisdiction for cases 
that involve “important foreign policy implications”). 
170
 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). 
171




 The Supreme Court did not extensively reference Rooker in the Feldman decision. 
174
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the DC Court of Appeals reversed, 
determining that the proceedings under which Feldman’s waiver was denied were 




The Supreme Court reversed on the issue of the waiver denial.
178
 Feldman’s 
petition “involved a ‘judicial inquiry’ in which the [DC Court of Appeals] was 
called upon to investigate, declare and enforce” DC law.179   
If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court are 
inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial in a judicial proceeding of a 
particular plaintiff’s application for admission to the state bar, then the district 
court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision. This the 
district court may not do.
180
 
Feldman expanded the rule announced in Rooker.  Not only did state court 
judgments provide a jurisdictional bar to federal district courts, the bar also 
applied to claims “inextricably intertwined” with prior state court judgments.181 
Plaintiffs were theoretically prohibited from recasting their state appeals as new 
federal claims.
182
 Although it was several years before the doctrine went by the 
name Rooker-Feldman, federal district courts frequently applied it to prevent end-
runs around state court judgments.
183
 






 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479. 
180




 Dustin E. Buehler, Revisiting Rooker-Feldman: Extending the Doctrine to State Court 
Interlocutory Order, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 383 (2009) (quoting D.C. Court of 
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-84 n. 16 (1983)). 
183
 In 2005 and 2006, the US Supreme Court narrowed the applicablity of Rooker-
Feldman in two cases, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries, 544 U.S. 280, 284 
(2005) and Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 465 (2006). In Exxon, the Court rejected the 
Third Circuit’s application of Rooker-Feldman to a federal appeal where the federal 
litigation had commenced before entry of the state court judgment. The Court clarified 
that Rooker-Feldman was distinct and separate from abstention and preclusion doctrines 
and was limited to “cases brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by 
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 
U.S. at 284. In Lance v. Dennis, the Supreme Court allowed a federal suit by Colorado 
citizens challenging the Colorado Supreme Court’s invalidation of Colorado’s 
redistricting plan. The district court applied Rooker-Feldman on the basis that the parties 
to the federal suit stood “in privity” with the state court losers. The Supreme Court 
reversed, rejecting the application of privity, a preclusion principle, in the Rooker-
Feldman context. The “plaintiffs were plainly not parties to the underlying state-court 
proceeding.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 462-63. While the cases were characterized (and 
sometimes celebrated) as spelling the end of Rooker-Feldman, the Supreme Court failed 
to clarify two key aspects of the doctrine, thus ensuring its continued use in the lower 
federal courts. First, the Court did not clarify which state court judgments enjoyed 
Rooker-Feldman deference (e.g. interlocutory orders, stays, preliminary injunctions, 
rulings on pretrial motions and discovery orders). See Shelley v. Brandveen, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 127647 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2012) (citing Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 
703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996) (“It cannot be the meaning of Rooker-Feldman that, while the 
inferior federal courts are barred from reviewing final decisions of state courts, they are 
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a. White v. White 
In White v. White, a federal district court abstained under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine when Kevin White sought to challenge a state court 
custody determination in favor of Gabriela White that had been based in 
part on the state court’s adoption of an initial Hague Child Abduction 
Convention petition brought in German court.
184
 The district court applied 
the US Supreme Court’s most recent articulation of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine, which barred: 
cases brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by 
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 




The district court determined that Kevin had “lost” arguments regarding 
the proper construction of the German case which he asserted before the 
New York Supreme Court; that this “loss” caused his injuries (failure to 
return his children to him); and, that he urged the district court to 
circumvent the state custody determination through a Hague Child 
Abduction Convention return order.
186
 
b. Gaudin v. Remis 
 The inquiries authorized or mandated by the treaty produce other 
likely Rooker-Feldman scenarios.
187
 For example, judicial authorities 
considering Hague Child Abduction Convention petitions may not reach 
underlying custody claims, but in order for the treaty to apply, a court 
must determine whether a left-behind parent had, and was exercising, 
custody rights at the time of a wrongful removal and retention.
188
 Because 
the US Supreme Court has not specified which state judgments enjoy 
Rooker-Feldman protection, cumulative determinations may weigh against 
federal jurisdiction.
189
 For example, in Gaudin v. Remis, a Hawaii Family 
                                                                                                                         
free to review interlocutory orders.”)). Second, the Court did not address the extent to 
which claims must be “inextricably intertwined” for purposes of Rooker-Feldman. 
184
 White v. White, No. 12 Civ. 200(GBD)(JLC), 2012 WL 3041660, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 






 Michael R. Walsh & Susan W. Savard, International Child Abduction and the Hague 
Convention, 6 BARRY L. REV. 29, 37 (2006) (“All three of these issues (habitual 
residence, wrongful removal, and right of custody), may easily become inextricably 
tangled.”). 
188
 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (2010). 
189
 See Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: the Rooker-Feldman 
Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1092 (1999) (“But what if the federal 
plaintiff does not seek to enjoin the state proceeding, and state appeals are still pending? 
In this case, as we have already seen, Younger does not apply, and in some states 
interlocutory or appealable orders are given no preclusive effect. Here the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, as it is generally used in the lower courts, seems both necessary and 
appropriate.”). 
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Court determined on evidence adduced by a guardian ad litem that there 
was “a grave risk of psychological harm if the children [were] returned to 
their mother” in Canada.190 The district court noted that if the state court 
judge had applied a “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard, it could 
not have reviewed that determination under Rooker-Feldman.
191
 Similar 
variations on these facts are likely.
192
 If a party raises a treaty claim in 
connection with a state custody proceeding, and a trial court issues 
simultaneous rulings giving temporary custody to the adverse party and 
orders a hearing on “habitual residence,” is a federal district court divested 





FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT REJECTION OF ABSTENTION UNDER THE 
HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION 
Whatever the balance federal district courts have attempted to strike 
while weighing state interests and judicial economy with federal interests 
in treaty commitments, federal appellate courts have been overwhelmingly 
hostile to abstention decisions.
194
 Every federal appellate court before 
which Younger and Rooker-Feldman abstentions have been raised has 
rejected them. Indeed, the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal have 
adopted per se rules prohibiting the application of Rooker-Feldman. The 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have announced per se rules barring 
Younger abstention.
195
 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals alone has 
affirmed a district court abstention decision—based on Colorado River—
but more recently affirmed a district court decision to deny both Colorado 
                                                 
190
 Gaudin v. Remis, 00-00765-SPK (D. Haw. 2000) (citing Gaudin v. Remis, FC-P 93-
0625 (Fam. Ct. Haw. 2000)). 
191
 Because it was not clear which evidentiary standard the state court applied, the district 
court undertook its own review of the evidence establishing the grave risk exception and 
reached the same conclusion. Gaudin v. Remis, 379 F.3d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 2004). 
192
  In re Lehmann, No. 16353 / 16365, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1083 at *5 (Mar 21, 1997)  
(“Although the federal court denied Rolf’s requested relief, citing its concern that the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction, the court engaged in 
lengthy settlement negotiations and the parties resolved their dispute.”). 
193
 Barzilay v. Barzilay, No. 4:07CV01781 ERW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89304 (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 4, 2007). 
194
 See, e.g., Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 895 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Yang v. 
Tsui, 416 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005); Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2002). Justice Ginsburg effectively advocates 
that position in her Garamendi dissent. See also El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 
155, 175 (1999) (“Our home-centered preemption analysis, therefore, should not be 
applied, mechanically, in construing our international obligations.”). 
195
 The Seventh Circuit announced its rule in an opinion issued on July 26, 2002 after the 
parties had settled, but before the court had received notice of the settlement. Therefore, 
the opinion is technically advisory, but should the Seventh Circuit revisit the issue, it is 
likely to accord the judgment significant weight. Bouvagnet v. Bouvagnet, 45 Fed. Appx. 
535 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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River and Younger abstention based on reasoning similar to that adopted 
by other federal appellate courts.
196
 
 To be sure, ICARA vests a party with the option to raise his or her 
claim in either federal or state court. The treaty also prohibits a court from 
adjudicating the merits of a custody suit pending the resolution of the 
wrongful removal claim. So, even if a state court plaintiff initiates divorce 
and child custody proceedings, the state court defendant may bring a 
separate action in federal court. These circumstances, without more, might 
not justify abstention. Indeed, the Third Circuit in Yang v. Tsui explained 
the pattern in federal appellate decisions not by which sovereign was 
better able to enforce international obligations, but by whether or not a 
Hague Convention petition had been filed in state court.
197
 In Yang, the 
Third Circuit could rightly point to the fact that not only had no party 
raised a Hague Convention petition in the underlying state custody 
proceeding, but that a final judgment had been entered resolving the entire 




A. Narrow Construction of Hague “Petitions” in State Courts 
 But federal appellate decisions have rejected abstention even in cases 
where a left-behind parent initially selected a state forum or substantially 
engaged state judicial process in pursuance of a Hague Child Abduction 
Convention claim. Article 8 of the treaty specifies the information 
required of a return application to a central authority, but Congress made 
no association between those requirements and pleading under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.
199
 Congress included only a permissive 
provision regarding a Hague Child Abduction Convention claim, noting 
that a claimant “may  . . . [file] a petition for the relief sought in any court 
which has jurisdiction . . . .”200 The State Department’s legal analysis 
suggests that applicants provide as much information to a court as Article 
                                                 
196
 Copeland v. Copeland, No. 97-1665, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1670 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 
1998) (affirming district court Colorado River abstention); Hazbun v. Rodriguez, 52 Fed. 
Appx. 207 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding district court rejection of Colorado River and 
Younger abstention). 
197
 Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2005). 
198
 Id. at 204. 
199
 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8, art. 8, requires an application to a 
Central Authority to include information concerning the identity of the applicant, the 
child, and the person alleged to have removed or retained the child. Where available, the 
date of birth of the child, the grounds on which the applicant’s claim for return of the 
child is based, and all available information relating to the whereabouts of the child and 
the identity of the person with whom the child is presumed to be should be included. The 
application may be accompanied or supplemented by an authenticated copy of any 
relevant decision or agreement, a certificate or affidavit emanating from a Central 
Authority, other competent authority of the State of the child’s habitual residence, or 
from a qualified person, concerning the relevant law of that State, and any other relevant 
document. 
200
 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2006).  
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8 requires, but notes “the informal nature of the pleading and proof 
requirements; Article 8(c) merely requires a statement in the application to 
the Central Authority as to ‘the grounds on which the applicant’s claim for 
return of the child is based.’”201 Federal appellate courts, however, have 
adopted fatal scrutiny in cases where a federal district court abstained 
without a Hague Child Abduction Convention claim being brought in the 




1.  Barzilay v. Barzilay 
 In the aforementioned case of Barzilay v. Barzilay, for example, the 
state court plaintiff brought her Hague Child Abduction claim in her 
motion for modification of the divorce decree while the state court 
defendant raised his request for return in his answer to her motion.
203
 The 
state court entered an order rejecting the state court defendant’s assertion 
that Israel was the children’s habitual residence under the treaty.204 The 
federal district court abstained, ruling that the state court defendant (the 
federal court plaintiff) was required to appeal through Missouri courts.
205
 
The Eighth Circuit reversed, adopting a per se rule that abstention was 
inappropriate in Hague Child Abduction Convention cases.
206
 The Eighth 
Circuit appeared aware of the tension between the state court judgment 
and its own refusal to affirm the abstention decision:  
 
Tamar stated that Sagi used the Israeli court system “to fraudulently 
procure a judgment giving Israel exclusive jurisdiction over the 
custody of the minor children . . . in blatant defiance of . . . the Hague 
Treaty on Child Abduction.” She did not reference the terms of the 
Hague treaty or explain how Sagi’s use of the Israeli court system 
implicated the treaty. In her motion for a temporary restraining order, 
Tamar argued that the Israeli judgment . . . should have deferred to the 
Missouri court given its existing custody judgment and the habitual 
residence of the children. She also complained that Sagi’s use of the 
                                                 
201
 Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 10494, 10498 (Mar. 26, 1986) (quoting Elisa Pérez-Vera, HCCH Explanatory 
Report on the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction). 
202
 See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, No. 96-6268, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18116, at *9-10 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 6, 1996) (rejecting the mother’s attempt to re-litigate a Hague Child Abduction 
claim on the basis that “she clearly stated the source of her alleged custody rights and the 
date of the alleged wrongful retention, and requested in her prayer for relief that she be 
allowed to return to the United Kingdom with the four children.”). 
203




 Barzilay v. Barzilay, No. 4:07CV01781 ERW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89304 (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 4, 2007). 
206
 Barzilay v. Barzilay, 536 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The controlling case in our circuit 
is Silverman I, which concluded that abstention was inappropriate in Hague Convention 
cases.”). 
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 The decision turned in significant part on the role of federal courts in 
upholding international commitments: 
 
Moreover, given that Sagi obtained a custody determination from an 
Israeli court and Tamar has obtained a custody determination from a 
state court in this country, the federal district court is uniquely situated 
to adjudicate the question of whether Israel or Missouri is the habitual 
residence of the Barzilay children and whether they were wrongfully 
removed from that residence. Although the state clearly has an 
important interest in child custody matters, that interest has not been 





 It is not clear why a federal district court judge would be better 
“situated” to determine the habitual residence of children where domestic 
and foreign custody orders conflict—a situation state courts face with 
some frequency and to which federal courts hearing claims based on 
diversity of citizenship apply so-called “domestic relations” abstention.209 
2. Silverman v. Silverman 
 In Silverman v. Silverman, the federal plaintiff had initially asserted 
Israel to be the “habitual residence” of the children under the Hague Child 
Abduction Convention in Minnesota state court, and had defended his 
claim of a “wrongful removal” from Israel before a state court 
magistrate.
210
 He filed a Hague Child Abduction Convention petition 
                                                 
207
 Id. at 851. 
208
 Barzilay, 536 F.3d at 844 (internal citations omitted). 
209
 See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying domestic relations 
abstention in a suit by Romanian citizens against California residents to determine marital 
status); In re D.M.T.-R., M.C., 802 N.W.2d 759, 764-765 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). The 
Minnesota court noted:  
For example, the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction divests 
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over child custody decrees . . . Thus we 
conclude that the UCCJEA confers to state courts subject matter jurisdiction over 
child custody proceedings, including the termination of parental rights involving a 
child who is not a United States citizen but who is in Minnesota. Id.  
See also Maqsudi v. Maqsudi, 830 A.2d 929 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) 
(adjudicating dispute between New Jersey and Uzbekistan custody decrees). 
210
 Silverman v. Silverman, 267 F.3d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 2001) (“At the hearing before a 
state-court referee on October 10, Robert’s attorney argued the jurisdictional issue, and 
the referee engaged her in a discussion of the facts surrounding the parties’ move to Israel, 
the bankruptcy, and the status of the children in Minnesota at the time. Counsel 
repeatedly asserted that the court should not reach the merits of the custody issue, noting 
that the children’s physical presence in Minnesota was the result of an allegedly wrongful 
removal from Israel.”). 
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motion in federal court on the day of the state court hearing.
211
 The state 
court later entered an order granting temporary custody to the state court 
plaintiff and scheduled a hearing for the remaining claims.
212
 On this basis, 
the federal district court dismissed under Younger.
213
 The Eighth Circuit 
reversed, determining that Younger abstention did not apply because 
federal courts enjoyed no equitable discretion under the treaty.214 The 
court did not discuss the jurisdictional issue and ultimately concluded that 
because  
 
the Hague issue has not been addressed . . . we believe the appropriate 
course of action is to remand the matter to the district court to consider 
whether the Silverman children were wrongfully removed. We note 
that nearly a year has passed since Robert filed his petition under the 





 After the case was remanded, the Minnesota trial court entered a final 
custody determination, including a finding that Minnesota was the 
children’s “home state” under Minnesota law.216 Reviewing the district 
court’s later denial of the Hague Child Abduction Convention claim, the 
Eighth Circuit analyzed the effect of the state court’s “home state” 
determination on the “habitual residence” inquiry under the treaty.217  
While the court concluded that those questions were not “inextricably 
intertwined” within the meaning of Rooker-Feldman, it took the additional 
step of establishing the doctrine’s per se inapplicability because “Congress 
adopted the Hague Convention, an international treaty, making it, under 
the Constitution, part of the ‘supreme Law of the Land’”218 and therefore 
Rooker-Feldman did not apply outside of the implementing statute’s full 
faith and credit clause.
219
 
                                                 
211




 Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 2003). 
213
 Silverman, No. 00-2274 (PAM/JGL) at 9 (D. Minn. Nov. 13, 2000). 
214
 Silverman, 267 F.3d at 788. The Eighth Circuit rejected Younger abstention on the 
basis that relief under the treaty is mandatory and therefore there is no equitable 
discretion. Even if the Eighth Circuit’s analysis as to its equitable powers under treaties 
in general is correct, the treaty provides a number of discretionary forms of relief to 
judicial authorities and Congress specifically vested both federal and state courts with the 
power to impose provisional remedies. See, e.g., Merle H. Weiner, Uprooting Children in 
the Name of Equity, 33 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 409 (2010) (discussing federal courts’ use 
of equitable estoppel and tolling under certain treaty provisions). 
215
 Silverman, 267 F.3d at 792. 
216




 Id. at 894. 
219
 Silverman, 338 F.3d at 886, 892. State court orders under the treaty, it determined, 
were limited to those falling under 42 U.S.C. § 11603(g) (2006) providing that “full faith 
and credit shall be accorded by the courts of the States and the courts of the United States 
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B. The Role of the Federal Courts in Upholding Treaty Obligations 
 The recurrent theme in federal appellate decisions is that—Congress’s 
explicit grant of concurrent original jurisdiction notwithstanding—
responsibility for upholding international obligations is a fundamental 
function of the federal courts. These decisions are relatively vague as to 
which federal treaty interests need protecting—uniformity in interpretation, 
reciprocity between contracting states, or the treaty provisions that federal 
courts are uniquely able to adjudicate and enforce.
220
 The emphasis is 
instead on the general constitutional entrustment of treaty obligations to 
the federal courts and skepticism that state courts will respect the United 
States’ international commitments. 
 
  In Grieve v. Tamerin, the Second Circuit grudgingly affirmed an 
abstention decision by the US District Court for the Southern District of 
New York because the state court rendered a final decision on the Hague 
Child Abduction Convention petition after the abstention order.
221
 The 
Second Circuit noted the role of the federal judiciary in enforcing the 
United States’ international obligations: 
 
Grieve’s claim implicates a paramount federal interest in foreign 
relations and the enforcement of United States treaty obligations. 
Deference to a state court’s interest in the outcome of a child custody 
dispute would be particularly problematic in the context of a Hague 
Convention claim inasmuch as the Convention divests the state of 
jurisdiction over these custody issues until the merits of the Hague 
Convention claim have been resolved. New York State’s interests do 
not, then, appear to raise the sort of substantial comity concerns that 
require Younger abstention. We are nonetheless constrained to affirm 
the judgment of the district court. The Southern District’s decision in 
Grieve’s action there, a final judgment on the merits subject to no 
further review holding that, once the Hague Convention had been 
raised in the state court litigation, Younger required the 
court’s abstention from further adjudication of Grieve’s Convention-
                                                                                                                         
to the judgment of any other such court ordering or denying the return of a child pursuant 
to the Convention, in an action brought under this Act.” 
220
 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 383 (2006) (“[U]niformity is an important 
goal of treaty interpretation.”); Vicki Jackson, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 303, 356 (2006) (“A basic premise of the constitutional system has long been that 
appellate review of state court decisions is particularly important where treaty rights are 
asserted, both to assure a uniformity of interpretation and to minimize the possibilities of 
error in sensitive areas affecting foreign relations.”); Trans World Airlines v. Franklin 
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The great object of an 
international agreement is to define the common ground between sovereign nations.”). 
221
 Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2001). The litigant filed a habeas petition in 
the Eastern District of New York raising the same issues as his petition in the Southern 
District. By that time, the New York Supreme Court had entered a judgment on the 
Hague Abduction Convention claim.   
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 In its one decision addressing abstention under the Hague Child 
Abduction Convention—a case in which the federal plaintiff was 
convicted of murdering the children’s mother, fleeing to Mexico, and 
violating numerous state court orders regarding the custody of his children 
in the process—the Sixth Circuit did not engage in any extensive analysis 
of the appellants’ abstention claim, but hinted that it would be disinclined 
to defer to state court proceedings.
223
 “We find the circumstances 
surrounding the entry of this default, like the circumstances surrounding 
the Tennessee contempt orders, highly unusual, and suggestive of the 
home court advantage that the treaty was designed to correct.”224   
  
 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit rejected district court abstention on the 
basis that:  
 
It was to curb [international parental kidnapping] that the United States 
assumed a treaty obligation to cooperate with other nations states to 
adopt a mutual policy in favor of restoring the status quo by means of 
the prompt return of abducted children to the country of their habitual 
residence and in this way depriving custody decrees of states to which 
a parent has removed a child “of any practical or juridical 
consequences.” Indeed, although the state to which the child has been 
taken no doubt has an important interest in adjudicating the custody of 
a child within its borders, it now shares, with the other states of the 
Union, an even more important interest in ensuring that its courts are 
not used to escape the strictures of a custody decree already rendered 
by another nation-state or to otherwise interfere with the custody rights 
that a parent enjoys under the law of another country. We hold, 
therefore, in agreement with the other Circuits that have confronted the 
issue, that a Hague petition simply does not implicate 




 While the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have adopted per se 
rules against Younger abstention, the Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit 
                                                 
222
 Id. at 149, 153. 
223
 March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001); In re S.L.M., 207 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2006) (detailing how Perry March murdered his wife then fled to Mexico to 
escape criminal prosecution and civil liability, lost custody battles with the maternal 
grandparents in Illinois and Tennessee courts, and then used the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention to have the children returned to Mexico). 
224
 March, 249 F.3d at 472. 
225
 Bouvagnet v. Bouvagnet, No. 01-3928, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17661 (7th Cir. July 
26, 2002) vacated pursuant to settlement agreement, Bouvagnet v. Bouvagnet, No. 01-
3928, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17954 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2002). 
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Courts of Appeals have implicitly foreclosed Colorado River 
abstention.
226
   
 
 In Lops v. Lops, a left-behind parent initially brought her Hague Child 
Abduction Convention petition in a Georgia state court, which determined 
that it did not have jurisdiction over the case, and transferred the matter to 
the South Carolina Family Court which did have jurisdiction.
227
 As in 
Silverman, the state trial court granted the taking parent temporary custody 
pending a later hearing.
228
 The left-behind parent then filed a Hague Child 
Abduction Convention petition in the federal district court in Georgia.
229
 
The Lops court noted: “After all, the act and the treaty, which the 
Petitioner seeks to enforce, are creatures of the federal sovereign as 
opposed to any state’s sovereignty.”230 
 
 In Holder v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit rejected federal district court 
abstention on the basis of Colorado River even though the federal plaintiff 
had initiated state custody and divorce proceedings, was given the 
opportunity to brief the petition claim in state proceedings, and the state 
appellate panel had considered the views of the United States as amicus on 
the Hague Convention claim.
231
 The decision forced litigation in both 
California state court and Washington federal court—a result which 
weighed against the convenience of the federal forum and consolidated 
litigation.
232
 The Ninth Circuit determined that it need not apply “general 
res judicata principles” where “the implementation of federal statutes 
representing countervailing and compelling federal policies justifies 
departures from a strict application.”233 Similarly, the majority held that 
Rooker-Feldman did not apply in the Hague Child Abduction Convention 
context because “Congress has expressly granted the federal courts 
jurisdiction to vindicate rights arising under the Convention.
234
 Thus, 
                                                 
226
 Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2002). The court noted: 
In light of the Hague Convention policy that signatory countries should return 
wrongfully removed children expeditiously and through any appropriate remedy, we 
reject the claim that a left-behind parent is precluded or barred from raising his 
Hague Convention claim in the court of his choice, or that “wise judicial 
administration” is furthered by staying a federal Hague petition, simply because that 
left-behind parent has pursued the return of his children through multiple legal 
avenues. Id. 
227
 Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 934 (11th Cir. 1998). 
228




 Id. at 943 n. 22. 
231
 In that brief, the United States argued that the Hague Abduction Convention was not 
meant to be used to give a litigant an opportunity to re-litigate custody. 
232
 Holder v. Holder, No. C001927C., 2003 WL 24091906 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2003). 
233
 Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2002). 
234
 Id. (citing Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1085 n. 55 (9th Cir. 2001)) (“Congress has 
expressly granted the federal courts jurisdiction to vindicate rights arising under the 
Convention. Thus, federal courts must have the power to vacate state custody 
determinations and other state court orders that contravene the treaty." It clearly follows 
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federal courts must have the power to vacate state custody determinations 
and other state court orders that contravene the treaty.”235 
 
 This conclusion sits uneasily with the statutory language. ICARA 
established concurrent original jurisdiction between federal and state 
courts. Its full faith and credit provision does not establish a hierarchy 
between federal and state courts; instead, it requires horizontal parity 
between state judgments and vertical parity between federal and state 
courts. As the United States noted in its amicus brief in Holder, the full 
faith and credit provision was included because a court may exercise 
jurisdiction over a treaty claim even where the children are physically 
located elsewhere.
236
 The statute simply confirmed that a second action 
was unnecessary. Also, Congress vested federal district courts with 
original jurisdiction, leaving in place Rooker-Feldman’s admonition to 
lower federal courts to not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court 
judgments. 
 
 The Holder dissent noted that the federal plaintiff, an American citizen, 
plainly used his federal petition to undermine an unfavorable custody 
judgment issued by the California forum he had chosen—a result not only 
inconsistent with the treaty’s purpose, but also only justifiable by 
subordinating state courts to federal courts in the resolution of Hague 
Child Abduction Convention claims.
237
 
                                                                                                                         
that, if a prior state court custody order cannot bar a federal court from vacating the state 




 In re Marriage of Holder, No. F036747, 2002 WL 443397 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 
2002). 
237
 Holder, 305 F.3d at 875. The Judiciary Committee’s House report noted: 
[Section 11603(g)] means, for example, that if a court in one jurisdiction has ordered 
the return of a child and the child is located in another jurisdiction in the United 
States before that order has been executed, the order shall be given full effect in the 
second jurisdiction without the need to initiate a new return action there pursuant to 
the Convention and [ICARA]. H.R. Rep. No. 100-525, at 12 (1988).  
In other words, the provision exists to reinforce the importance that a return order under 
ICARA be effected with haste and to close the door on any possible delay or 
manipulation by the allegedly abducting parent. It is unreasonable to assume that 
Congress intended to create a singular exception to a large body of statutory and common 
law but declined to mention this intent in any way. Additionally, an amicus brief filed by 
the United States in Holder and cited by the dissent stated that: 
the Hague Convention was not intended to allow the “left-behind parent” a second 
bite at the custody apple just because, after specifically electing to litigate custody in 
a forum that otherwise had jurisdiction, the parent suffered an adverse result . . . The 
majority opinion . . . gives the left-behind parent a windfall by providing him 
with two opportunities to litigate custody: once in state court, and if he is unhappy 
with the result, all over again in another forum under the Hague Convention. Holder, 
305 F.3d at 875 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae United 
States) (unpublished decision). 
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C. Rejecting Jurisdiction over Rights of Access 
 This jurisprudence is in contrast with emerging federal appellate 
decisions rejecting jurisdiction over “rights of access” under ICARA and 
the Hague Child Abduction Convention. Although ICARA makes clear 
that a petitioner may pursue, in federal or state court, “an action for 
arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of 
access” and an action for return after a wrongful removal or retention, 
federal courts have determined that, because the treaty lacks a specific 





 It is possible to read their jurisdictional mandate in that way if federal 
courts turn their inquiry on the Congressional mandate to “decide cases in 
accordance with the Convention.”239 The treaty’s provisions speak at 
greater length to judicial conduct governing return actions than access 
actions.
240
 Article 21, covering actions for rights of access, suggests a 
prominent role for “Central Authorities” and international cooperation, but 
refers explicitly to that cooperation in “proceedings” aimed at ensuring 
access.
241
 Even if it were the case that the treaty exclusively committed 
access rights to “Central Authorities”—the US State Department as 
opposed to judicial authorities—that reading would apply equally to 
federal and state courts. Federal courts have not, however, ruled that 
ICARA does not vest courts with jurisdiction over access claims. Indeed, 
it would be difficult to do so given the statutory language. Instead, federal 
courts have determined that access claims are intended for state court 
adjudication: 
 
With the exception of the limited matters of international child 
abduction or wrongful removal claims, which is expressly addressed 
by the Convention and ICARA, other child custody matters, including 
access claims, would be better handled by the state courts which have 
                                                                                                                         
Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8, art. 1. (“The objects of the present 
convention are . . . to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one 
Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”). 
238
 Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Because courts in the United States 
have jurisdiction to enforce the Convention by ordering a child's return to her habitual 
residence only if the child has been removed in breach of a petitioning parent's custodial 
rights, the district court lacked jurisdiction to order return in this case.”); Cantor v. 
Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2006). 
239
 Cantor, 442 F.3d at 202; In re S.E.O., 873 F. Supp. 2d 536, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“Given the language of the statute, this Court finds that it has jurisdiction to enforce 
Petitioner’s rights of access to the Children, and orders Respondent to comply with the 
visitation rights set forth by the Turkish Court’s May 13, 2011 Order, so long as the 
Children remain in the United States.”).  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion in S.E.O., but recast the case as a custody rights case.  See Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 
708 F.3d 355 (2013). 
240
 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8, art. 12-20.,  
241
 Id. art. 21. 
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the experience to deal with this specific area of the law . . . a state 
court would have the ability to weigh the children’s interests, the 
parent’s interests, and other familial considerations. Therefore, we find 




In Abbott v. Abbott, the US Supreme Court’s only decision in interpreting 
the Hague Child Abduction Convention, the Court mentioned remedies 
available for violations of rights of access by referring to a Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court case, but did not otherwise address federal court 




 It might be that rights of access under the treaty fall within the core 
issues of child custody decrees, divorce, and marriage to which “domestic 
relations” abstention is applicable.244 Yet the treaty itself draws relatively 
sharp lines between “rights of custody” and “rights of access.”245 Federal 
appellate courts have emphasized the distinction in the return context to 
extend federal jurisdiction deep into state adjudications of treaty claims. If 
federal courts are applying “domestic relations” abstention, they are doing 
so somewhat unconventionally as that doctrine is generally applied where 
federal courts sit in diversity—not in suits seeking rights arising under a 
federal treaty.
246
 Federal courts’ refusal to hear access claims provides 
additional evidence that, in the treaty context, federal courts see 
themselves playing an independent constitutional role in managing their 
jurisdiction. 
 
D. Rejection of Abstention and the Frustration of Federal and State 
Interests 
 
 Federal appellate decisions rejecting abstention ultimately frustrate the 
realization of the federal and state interests Congress had sought to protect. 
                                                 
242
 Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2006);  Fernandez v. Yeager, 121 F. 
Supp. 2d 1118, 1126 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (matters relating to access are best left to the 
state courts, which are more experienced in resolving these issues); Bromley v. 
Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 862 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("The arena of child custody matters, 
except for the limited matters of international abduction expressly addressed by the 
Convention,  would better be handled by the state courts which are more numerous and 
have both the experience and resources to deal with this special area of the law."); Croll v. 
Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (“One such remedy is a writ ordering the 
custodial parent who has removed the child from the habitual residence to permit, and to 
pay for, periodic visitation by the non-custodial parent with access rights.”) (citation 
omitted); Wiezel v. Wiezel-Tyrnauer, 388 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
243
 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (2010). 
244
 Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: 
Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV. 669 (1995). 
245
 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 8, art. 3. 
246
 See Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 131 (2009). 
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With respect to federal interests under the treaty, the application of 
abstention is consistent with the treaty’s requirement that wrongful 
removal claims be adjudicated expeditiously. The United States is among 
the slowest contracting states with respect to the resolution of claims.
247
 
Even in cases where the state’s interests focus on a generalized concern 
with custody adjudications, Colorado River abstention may be the best 
way to promote the treaty’s purpose of rapid adjudication.248 Raising (or 
re-raising) a Hague Child Abduction Convention claim in federal court 
adds to the delay in a treaty that contemplates a six-week adjudication 
period. The Barzilay and Holder cases provide good illustrations. The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Barzilay 
children’s habitual residence was Missouri on April 2, 2010, two and a 
half years after the state trial court had reached the same conclusion.
249
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Holder 
children were not habitual residents of Germany on December 9, 2004, 




 State interests in Hague Child Abduction Convention cases also take a 
stronger form than generalized interests in child custody. In Witherspoon v. 
Orange County Department of Social Services, the state agency 
participated in the litigation in its role of protecting children from 
domestic abuse.
251
 The state plaintiff, losing her treaty claim in state court, 
filed her federal treaty claim after the state appellate court had vacated the 
trial court order.
252
 Under current law, abstention alternatives available to 
the federal district court are limited and heavily scrutinized. In the Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits, Younger abstention would not be available to 
safeguard the state’s interest in protecting minors from abuse, and in the 
Ninth Circuit—where the suit originated—neither Colorado River nor 
Rooker-Feldman would permit abstention based on judicial economy, 
Congressional intent with adjudication of treaty claims in state court, or 
the existence of a state return order (because it had been vacated).
253
 
                                                 
247
 Eric Lesh, Jurisdiction Friction and the Frustration of the Hague Convention: Why 
International Child Abduction Cases Should be Heard Exclusively by Federal Courts, 49 
FAM. CT. REV. 170, 174 (2010). 
248
 Ion Hazzikostas, Note, Federal Court Abstentation and the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 421,424 (2004). 
249
 See Barzilay v. Barzilay, 04FC10567 (St. Louis Cnty. Oct. 16, 2007) (rejecting Sagi 
Barzilay’s request for return); Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding district court determination that Israel was not children’s habitual residence). 
250
 See In re Marriage of Holder, No. F036747, 2002 WL 443397 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 
2002) (holding that Jeremiah Holder waived his Hague Convention claim); Holder v. 
Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding federal district court determination that 
Germany was not the Holder children’s habitual residence). 
251
 Witherspoon v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 646 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 




 In Gaudin v. Remis, which did not involve Younger abstention, the Ninth Circuit 
suggested that the doctrine would be inapplicable to Hague Child Abduction Convention 




 This is problematic because it upends the Congressional purpose 
behind the grant of original jurisdiction to both federal and state courts. It 
is possible to read the statutory language to authorize federal jurisdiction 
over any and all aspects of a Hague Child Abduction Convention claim 
short of a final state judgment, but that reading is in tension with aspects 
of ICARA that require deference to state law and statutory and common 
law prohibitions against re-litigation of claims. The requirement that 
federal and state courts give full faith and credit to each other’s grant or 
denial of return orders cannot mean that Congress intended federal courts 
to exercise jurisdiction over Hague Child Abduction Convention claims 





 Federal appellate courts’ dicta that custody interests alone cannot 
justify abstention are almost certainly correct.
255
 By its terms, the treaty 
separates habitual residence and custody determinations, despite the 
significant overlap between the factual findings necessary to determine 
both.
256
 Federal appellate courts have used this distinction to suggest that 
because the treaty does not allow a court to adjudicate the merits of a 
custody dispute before a decision on return, the statutory scheme opens 
only a narrow window for state court jurisdiction. The effect of this line of 
reasoning is to upend the legislative purpose behind state court jurisdiction 
in the first place. Instead of using state courts’ general authority and 
expertise in child custody adjudications as a reason to vest them with 
original jurisdiction over Hague Child Abduction Convention claims, it is 
used to strip away treaty claims to federal court, often with the disruptive, 
dilatory, and fracturing effects abstention was fashioned to prevent.  In 
short, because state courts deal with child custody, they cannot be trusted 
to deal with child custody.
257
 
                                                                                                                         
claims. The district court in Witherspoon emphasized that the state interest justifying 
Younger abstention was dependency, not custody. Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
254
 Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is clear that if the state proceeding 
is one in which the petitioner has raised, litigated and been given a ruling on the Hague 
Convention claims, any subsequent ruling by the federal court on the same issues would 
constitute interference.”). 
255
 See id. at 204. 
256
 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1402 (6th Cir. 1993). 
257
 The US Supreme Court’s only decision regarding the treaty, Abbott v. Abbott, was 
necessary because federal appellate courts determined with one exception that a non-
custodial parent’s right to prevent a custodial parent’s foreign travel did not give the left-
behind parent a right to demand return of a child. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (2010). 
The Hague Child Abduction Treaty 45 
 
IV. 
STATE AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF THE HAGUE ABDUCTION 
CONVENTION 
  
 Doing away with abstention might make more sense if state courts 
were truly guilty of undermining federal commitments under the treaty. 
The measurable reality is that they are not. Based on cases reported in 
major databases, state trial courts order return of children abroad and 
reject affirmative defenses at the same rate as federal trial courts. While 
any empirical study of published orders must necessarily be taken for the 
imperfect exercise it is, empirical comparisons can give us at least some 
picture of how federal and state courts approach treaty claims. 
The first difficulty is identifying all claims for return of a child. 
Because a petitioner is not required to exhaust or even resort to the State 
Department’s diplomatic processes, data on the number of Hague Child 
Abduction Convention cases pending in the United States is never 
precise.
258
 A 2008 study undertaken by the Hague Conference estimated 
329 incoming cases to the United States each year, and that approximately 
one-fifth of those applications end in a voluntary return of the child.
259
 
This leaves approximately 6,300 cases over a twenty-four year period in 
which parties sought judicial resolution.
260
 There were only 373 federal or 
state trial judgments under the treaty reported in LEXIS and Westlaw, 
suggesting that approximately six percent of the cases go to trial.
261
 That 
rate is higher than the general rate of civil claims going to trial in federal 




A second difficulty is ascertaining factors like settlement rates and 
resolutions occurring short of a final court order. The analysis provided 
herein is premised upon the Hague Child Abduction Convention petitions 
filed in state or federal trial courts that reach final judgment. The analysis 
is therefore not representative of the relative ability of federal or state 
judges to facilitate pre-judgment settlement, and does not answer whether, 
                                                 
258
 Walshand & Savard, supra note 119 at 30 (noting difficulty in accurately measuring 
international child abductions). 
259
 Hague Conference on Private International Law, A Statistical Analysis of Applications 
Made in 2008 Under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, Part I, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct2011pd08ae.pdf (Nov. 2011). A similar study 
conducted on 2003 cases placed the number at 345. 
260
 Hague Conference on Private International Law, A Statistical Analysis of Applications 
Made in 2008 Under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, Part III, 180, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct2011pd08c.pdf. 
261
 This quotient is derived by dividing 384 by 6,300. 
262
 MARLENE M. BROWNE, THE DIVORCE PROCESS: EMPOWERMENT THROUGH 
KNOWLEDGE (2001). 
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in aggregate, state court parties settle at the same rate as federal court 
parties. Indeed, given the idiosyncratic nature of family disputes that give 
rise to international abductions, it is difficult to see how the broader 
picture might be accurately assessed. The analysis is also indifferent as to 
the United States or a state agency acting as an amicus curiae or litigant in 
a Hague Child Abduction Convention proceeding. Those limitations aside, 
this discussion proceeds on the assumption that these influences would 
affect federal and state adjudications in the same manner. 
 
The evidentiary division between remedies and affirmative defenses 
under ICARA frames the empirical part of this article. The following 
hypothesis is tested: state judges order fewer returns of children abroad 
than federal judges either by finding the treaty inapplicable or by liberally 
interpreting affirmative defenses available to the taking parent. In order to 
test this hypothesis, I collected all federal and state trial court cases in 
which Hague Child Abduction Convention claims were raised through 
August 16, 2012.
263
 Within this set, I separately analyzed cases in which 
parties raised affirmative defenses under the treaty. 
A. State Judicial Management of Hague Child Abduction Convention 
Claims 
 
In ninety-five state trial court judgments, state judges determined 
that the treaty applied in seventy-five cases, or 78.9 percent, of cases 
brought before them. In the twenty, or 21.1 percent, of cases where the 
state court rejected the treaty’s application, four decisions were based on 
what I consider to be objectively clear rules under the treaty. For example, 
state judges dismissed Hague Child Abduction Convention petitions where 
claims were brought to return children to non-party states, or where 
attempts were made to invoke the treaty to enforce rights over a child who 
had reached sixteen years of age.
264
 
                                                 
263
 I used the search terms “ICARA” or “International Child Abduction Remedies Act” or 
“Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction” or “28 U.S.C. 
§ 11601” or “28 U.S.C. § 11603” or “grave risk of physical or psychological harm” or 
“age and degree of maturity,” ending on August 16, 2012. For state cases this yielded an 
initial set of 238 cases (Lexis (238), Westlaw (231)) but only 95 cases in which a Hague 
Child Abduction Convention claim was actually raised in state court. For example, a 
decision may cite a statute in which ICARA was included, refer to Hague Convention 
adjudications in foreign countries, involve a non-custodial issue under the Convention 
(like service of process), use the Hague Convention as part of a risk-of-abduction analysis 
for a custody determination, cite the Hague Convention for another proposition of law 
such as a rule of treaty interpretation, or be in a state court action that was removed to 
federal court. The same search resulted in 456 federal district court cases (Lexis (456), 
Westlaw (433)), of which 278 cases involved the litigation of a Hague Child Abduction 
Convention claim. In cases where only state appellate court decisions were available, 
those were used to ascertain the trial court judgment. 
264
 See In re Gold, No. 1 CA-CV 10-0471, 2011 WL 2462474 (Ariz. Ct. App. June, 21 
2011) (Ghana is not a party to the Hague Convention); In re David B., 164 Misc. 2d 566 
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Even where state courts determined that the treaty was not 
applicable, that conclusion resulted in deference to a foreign jurisdiction to 
adjudicate custody in two cases. In L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office, a New 
York Family Court determined that there was no wrongful removal of the 
child under Article 3 of the Convention, and deferred to German 
proceedings after lengthy communications with the German family court 
judge.
265
 Similarly, a Minnesota trial court rejected a mother’s effort to 
prevent the removal of her child to Canada because the dispute involved 
visitation rights (return is not a mandated remedy under the treaty).
266
 In 
the remaining cases, the determination that the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention did not apply resulted in either the retention of children in the 
United States or an order that they be returned to the United States, a 
conclusion consistent with the hypothesis that state judges tend to retain 
children in the United States even where doing so is in tension with treaty 
obligations. 
 
 In the seventy-five cases where it was determined that the treaty 
applied, state trial judges ordered the return of a child to a foreign country 
in fifty-five, or 73.3 percent, of them.  Those repatriation orders were 
issued from jurisdictions in which trial judges are elected in partisan 
elections,
267
 elected in non-partisan elections,
268
 selected through merit 
screening,
269
 selected by a judicial commission, nominated by a governor 










In thirty-three proceedings, litigants raised one or more of the 
affirmative defenses authorized by the Hague Abduction Convention. 
State courts rejected these affirmative defenses in twenty-three of these 
proceedings, or 69.7 percent of the time. In Hague Child Abduction 
Convention cases, defendants frequently raise the Article 13(b) affirmative 
defense, asserting a “grave risk that the child’s return would expose the 
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an 
                                                                                                                         
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1995) (Nigeria is not a party to the Hague Convention) ; In re R.P.B., 
2010, No. CA2009-07-097, 2010 WL 339812 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2010) (unpublished) 
(the Ohio juvenile court dismissed a father’s Hague Convention petition because the child 
had reached the age of sixteen and therefore relief was unavailable under the treaty); 
Terron v. Ruff, 116 Wash. App. 1019 (2003). 
265
 L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office, 150 Misc. 2d 490 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.150 1991). 
266
 In re T. G. M. D., 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS 329 (2011). 
267
 New York and Texas. 
268
 Arkansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington. 
269






 California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. 
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intolerable situation.”273 This claim can take the form of harms ranging 
from a child not wishing to return to his or her state of habitual residence 
to physical abuse at the hand of the left-behind parent. In approximately 
two-thirds of the cases, the taking parent is the mother, a fact which has 
caused some to argue that the Hague Child Abduction Convention 
insufficiently protects mothers fleeing domestic abuse.
274
 
B. Federal Judicial Management of Hague Abduction Convention Claims 
 In 278 federal trial court judgments, federal district court judges 
determined that the treaty applied in 229 cases, or 82.4 percent, of the time. 
In the forty-nine cases (17.6 percent) where the federal district court 
rejected the treaty’s application, a similarly small number of decisions 
were based on clear prohibitions on jurisdiction under the treaty.
275
 
Federal district courts, like state family or trial courts, find the treaty 
inapplicable primarily where the left-behind parent did not have custody 
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 See Gary Salkin, Note, The Increasing Incidence of American Courts Allowing 
Abducting Parents to Use the Article 13(b) Exception to the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 265 
(1999). 
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 Mirela Iverac, Protecting Kids: Rethinking the Hague Convention, TIME MAG., 
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2036246,00.html (Dec. 10, 
2010). 
275
 Mohamud v. Guuleed, No. 09-C-146, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42687, at *12 (E.D. Wis. 
May 4, 2009) (the child had turned sixteen); Mezo v. Elmergawi, 855 F. Supp. 59, 62 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); Mohsen v. Mohsen, 715 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D. Wyo. 1989) (“In light 
of the fact the petitioner’s daughter was last habitually resident in Bahrain, a 
noncontracting state, the court concludes that the petitioner has no rights under the 
Convention and is therefore not entitled to seek redress under its remedial provisions.”); 
Wiezel v. Wiezel-Tyrnauer, 388 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rights of visitation). 
276
 See Darin v. Olivero-Huffman, No. 12-1121, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116089, at *31 
(D.P.R. Aug. 16 2012) (habitual residence was Puerto Rico); Guzzo v. Cristofano, No. 11 
Civ. 7394 (RJS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149816, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30 2011) 
(habitual residence was New York); Walker v. Walker, No. 11 C 2967, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 121371, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2011) (no wrongful removal or exercise of 
custody rights); Radu v. Toader, 805 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (no breach of rights of 
custody); Johnson v. Johnson, No. 11 Civ. 37 (RMB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15258, at 
*21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) (Italy was not the habitual residence); Fernandez v. Bailey, 
No. 1:10CV00084 SNLJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70386, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Jul. 14, 2010) 
(finidng no rights of custody); Tamman v. Tamman, No. 08-00155 DAE-LEK, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 79318, at *70 (D. Haw. Oct. 8 2008) (Switzerland was not habitual 
residence); Maxwell v. Maxwell, No. 3:08-cv-254-RJC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103461, 
at *51 (W.D.N.C. Sep. 2, 2008) (Australia was not habitual residence nor was there a 
wrongful removal); Davis v. Strout, No. 07-cv-141-GZS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75272, 
at *4 (D. Me. Oct. 9, 2007) (requesting rights of access better handled by state court); 
Wagner v. Wagner, No. RWT 07-1347, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45720, at *9 (D. Md. 
June 21, 2007) (no habitual residence judgment was available for an infant); Roux v. 
Roux, No. CV 06-2203-PHX-JAT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8105, at *12 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 
2007) (there was no violation of rights of custody); Thompson v. Brown, No. 05 C 1648, 
2007 LEXIS 1187, at *48 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007) (child was not a habitual resident of the 
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 In the 229 cases in which it was determined that the treaty applied, 
federal district court judges ordered the return of a child to a foreign 
country in 163 of them, or 71 percent of the cases. In 177 proceedings, 
litigants raised one or more of the affirmative defenses authorized by 
ICARA. Federal district courts rejected these affirmative defenses in 123 
of these proceedings, or 69.5 percent of the cases. 
 
 On all of these metrics, state judges demonstrate close parity with 
federal judges. Based on reported cases, state judges order the return of 
children abroad at a slightly higher rate (73.3 percent to 71 percent) than 
federal judges, an outcome that suggests that plaintiffs have no greater 
difficulty vindicating treaty rights in state courts than in federal courts. 
State judges reject affirmative defenses under the treaty at a marginally 
higher rate than federal judges (69.7 percent to 69.5 percent), giving effect 
to the treaty drafters’ intent that exceptions be narrowly construed.277 As 
Thomas Johnson observed at the twentieth anniversary of the treaty, “both 
federal and state courts in the United States have given foreign parents and 
their governments little to complain about . . . .”278 
V. 
THE FUTURE OF ABSTENTION AND FAMILY LAW TREATIES 
All of this might be of modest import if the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention represented the end of US participation in family law treaties. 
But the increasing role of Congress and the President in these areas of 
family law has facilitated the US government’s engagement with at least 
three additional Hague Conference family law treaties.
279
 The United 
States has ratified the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Adoption 
                                                                                                                         
UK); March v. Levine, No. 3:06-0878, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 92931 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 22, 
2006) (there were no rights of custody). 
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 See Tahan v. Duquette, 259 N.J. Super. 328 (Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that the inquiry be 
limited to the level of safety in the state of habitual residence); Salkin supra note 273 
(citing in equal measure state and federal courts narrowing the scope of inquiry under the 
affirmative defenses); Renovala v. Roosa, No. FA 91 0392232 S, 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 
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 Congress passed the implementing Intercountry Adoption 
Act (IAA) in 2000 even though the State Department has only finalized 
implementing regulations relatively recently.
281
 The IAA explicitly 
preempts state laws only to the extent they are inconsistent with the IAA, 
and acknowledges the particular role of state courts in regulating 
emigration of US children to Convention countries.
282
 There is no 
concurrent jurisdictional statute, and private rights of action are not 
authorized. The existence of an extensive federal regulatory scheme for 
intercountry adoption, including participation by state regulatory agencies 
in the comment process, suggests that federalism questions under the 
treaty are more likely to center around preemption than jurisdiction.
283
 
The United States has also signed the Convention on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect 
of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children,
 284
 
and the Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and 
Other Forms of Family Maintenance
285—both of which will invite similar 
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difficulties in drawing the boundary between national interests in the 
treaty’s observance and state interests in the treaty’s underlying legal 
problems. As Ann Laquer Estin has noted, harmonization of these treaties 
with domestic US law will be difficult because of “our approach to 
federalism and the traditional role of state governments in family law.” 286 
This entire picture becomes even more muddled once we consider the 
potentially preemptive effect of federal common law,
287
 which is now 





The Hague Child Abduction Convention may be viewed in part as 
a victory for bicameral international lawmaking.
289
 The large 
Congressional majorities behind the implementing legislation represent an 
underlying interest by states in increasing the tools available to reach 
abducted children.
290
 Compared to federal judges, state judges have 
applied the treaty with an understanding of the importance of mutuality 
and reciprocity in making sure child custody is adjudicated in the 
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A similarly inclusive process governed the 
ratification of the Hague Adoption Convention.
 292
   
Yet the treaty has not been a story of the success of judicial 
federalism. Without wading into the much wider (and more perilous) 
debate surrounding the use of legislative history for purposes of statutory 
interpretation, it is fair to say that federal appellate courts have been 
relatively indifferent to the implicit Congressional admonition as to state 
family law interests and the explicit grant of original jurisdiction over 
petitions brought under the treaty.
293
 This indifference appears motivated 
in substantial measure by a suggested but forceful view of the relationship 
between federal courts and the rights imparted by treaties.
294
 If the United 
States is to continue to enter into treaties that fundamentally change or 
limit states’ authority over family law—and assuming Congress means 
what it says about state interests—it will need to either structure Article III 
jurisdiction more carefully or consider other alternatives.
295
 
Indeed, federal treaties may not even be preferable given some 
contracting states’ poor records with respect to Hague Child Abduction 
Convention enforcement.
296
 State executive agencies and law enforcement 
have successfully negotiated bilateral agreements with foreign sovereign 
states for some time—a practice that, at least impliedly, proceeds with 
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 If, however, federal treaties continue to 
dominate the future of transnational family dispute resolution, then greater 
attention to the jurisdictional divide between state and federal courts in 
implementing legislation is warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
If it is true that Congress wishes to safeguard state family law to 
the greatest extent possible as it enters more treaties dealing with child 
custody, family maintenance obligations, and divorce and marriage, then 
the experience with the Hague Child Abduction Convention counsels 
against a reliance on judicial federalism to accomplish that objective. The 
empirical part of this paper suggests that exclusive state court jurisdiction 
poses no threat to federal interests in uniformity and mutuality of 
decisions with other contracting states. Of course, this is not Congress’s 
only option.
298
 A second option is exclusive federal jurisdiction, a course 
which would at least eliminate delays caused by abstention 
adjudication.
299
 As Congress recognized in 1986, this option also 
engenders substantial federal intrusion into areas where states are 
generally better situated to administer the treaty’s purpose in part because 
they have oriented more resources toward doing so. Many Hague 
Conference participants recommend a specialized court to adjudicate 
petitions.
300
 Exclusive federal jurisdiction would reduce the time required 
for petitions to reach final conclusion and end the long delays caused by 
abstention and opportunistic forum shopping. Finally, Congress may 
attempt to draw jurisdictional lines between federal and state courts. It is 
not clear that ICARA’s original House version, which limited federal 
jurisdiction to a residual role over claims that did not involve a request for 
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return of a child, would have avoided the jurisdiction problems caused by 
concurrent original jurisdiction. Congress has certainly shown itself able 
to craft an abstention statute where federal and state interests regularly and 
predictably collide.
301
 Future family law treaties represent a fruitful area 
for the collaborative political process leading to the Hague Child 
Abduction Convention to go a bit further.
302
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